On Truth and Shielding in Child Abuse Trials by Montoya, Jean
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 43 | Issue 5 Article 1
1-1992
On Truth and Shielding in Child Abuse Trials
Jean Montoya
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jean Montoya, On Truth and Shielding in Child Abuse Trials, 43 Hastings L.J. 1259 (1992).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol43/iss5/1
Articles





In recent years, substantial attention has been given to the appropri-
ate testimonial procedures to be used when children testify in child abuse
cases. Concern has been expressed for the mental well-being of the child
confronted in a courtroom setting with the alleged perpetrator. This
concern for the child raises important issues for a society that has
deemed face-to-face confrontation crucial to the search for truth and has
determined that an accused is entitled to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him or her.
The sensationalism surrounding the early stages of the McMartin
case in the mid-1980s led to an explosion of state legislation designed to
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1. In March 1984, Ray Buckey, his sister, his mother, and his grandmother were ar-
rested along with three teachers on charges of child sexual abuse that allegedly occurred at the
family-run McMartin Pre-School. Lois Timnick & Carol McGraw, McMartin Verdict: Not
Guilty, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1990, at Al, A19. A county grand jury had indicted them on 115
counts. In May 1984, a criminal complaint superseded the indictment and charged them with
208 counts involving 41 children. The case alleged various sex crimes, "pornographic photog-
raphy sessions, 'naked games,' field trips away from the school for illicit purposes, animal
mutilation, threats and satanic-like ritual and sacrifice." Id. After an 18-month preliminary
hearing, a judge ordered all seven defendants to stand trial on 135 counts. Nevertheless, the
district attorney dropped all charges against five of the defendants in January 1986. Only Ray
Buckey and his mother, Peggy McMartin Buckey, were tried. Id. On January 18, 1990, a jury
acquitted Ray Buckey on 40 counts and deadlocked on 13 other counts. Peggy Buckey was
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protect child witnesses.2 An assortment of statutory features emerged
from this legislative activity. For example, a number of statutes provide
for videotaped depositions or the recording of testimony for later use at
trial, but only some of these statutes provide for shielding the child from
the defendant during taping of the testimony.3 Some statutes provide for
the live transmission of the child's testimony into the courtroom from a
separate testimonial room by one-way closed circuit television, but again,
not all of these provide for shielding the child from the defendant.4
acquitted on all counts. See McMartin Jury Deadlocks: Buckey Von't Be Retried, L.A.
TIMES, July 29, 1990, at Al, A28. In Ray Buckey's second trial, another jury deadlocked on
eight counts. "Votes on seven of the eight counts leaned toward acquittal." Id. at Al.
2. See LucY S. MCGOUGH, FRAGILE VOICES: THE CHILD WITNESS IN THE AMERI-
CAN LEGAL SYSTEM (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript ch. 7, at 2-3, on file with the Hastings
Law Journal); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legisla-
tive Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 808 (1985); see also S. 46, 1985-86 Reg. Sess., Cal.
Assembly File Analysis at 2 (April 9, 1985) ("The sponsor of this bill, the Children's Civil
Rights Fund, Inc., indicates that the bill was introduced in response to the McMartin Pre-
school child molestation case .... ").
3. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1991) (defendant present); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-4253 (1989) (child shielded); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (Michie 1987) (de-
fendant present); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-401.3 (West 1990) (no mention of defend-
ant); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1991) (defendant may be excluded);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1987) (defendant may be excluded); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 92.53 (West Supp. 1992) (defendant may be excluded); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns
Supp. 1991) (child shielded); IOVA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1991) (defendant pres-
ent); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (1988 & Supp. 1991) (child shielded); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 421.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990) (child shielded); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 278, § 16D (West Supp. 1991) (defendant may be excluded); MICH. COMP. LAvs ANN.
§ 600.2163a (West Supp. 1991) (defendant not in child's direct view); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 595.02 (West 1988) (defendant may be excluded); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-407 (Supp.
1991) (defendant may be excluded); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.680 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (defend-
ant may be excluded); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1926 (1989) (defendant present); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 174.227 (Michie 1986) (court specifies who may be present); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1991) (defendant present); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Michie 1984)
(defendant present); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (Anderson 1987) (defendant's image
transmitted into testimonial room); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West Supp. 1992) (child
shielded); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5984 (Purdon Supp. 1991) (child shielded); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1991) (child shielded); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1410 (Law. Co-op.
1976 & Supp. 1990) (no mention of defendant); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1988)
(no mention of defendant); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-116 (Supp. 1991) (defendant present);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (child shielded); UTAH R_
CRIM. P. 15.5 (defendant may be excluded); VT. R. EVID. 807 (defendant may be excluded);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 967.04 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990) (court may exclude any person whose
presence is unduly stressful to the child); WYO. STAT. § 7-11-408 (1987) (defendant may be
excluded); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509 (West Supp. 1991) (if defendant excluded, defendant's
image transmitted into testimonial room).
4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1991) (defendant present); ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.45.046 (1990) (child shielded); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1989) (child
shielded); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1991) (defendant may be excluded);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West Supp. 1992) (defendant may be excluded); ILL. ANN. STAT.
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Other statutes provide for the live transmission of the child's testimony
by two-way closed circuit television, where the defendant's image is si-
multaneously transmitted to the child.5 Legislatures and courts applying
those statutes then looked to the United States Supreme Court for
guidance.
The semblance of guidance was forthcoming in Maryland v. Craig. 6
In Craig, the Court held that the Constitution does not require a child to
face the defendant in child abuse trials where trauma would result from
the confrontation. 7 The Court determined that the child may testify by
one-way closed circuit television upon an individualized showing that
such a procedure is "necessary" to protect the child from the trauma that
would otherwise result from testifying in the defendant's presence.8 At
ch. 38, para. 106A-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (defendant present); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-
4-8 (Burns Supp. 1991) (child shielded); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1991)
(defendant present); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (1988 & Supp. 1991) (child shielded); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990) (child shielded); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1992) (child shielded) (portion providing for shielding
found unconstitutional in State v. Murphy, 542 So. 2d 1373, 1376 (La. 1989), where earlier
version of statute did not require specific finding of necessity); MD. CODE ANN., CIS. & JUD.
PROC. § 9-102 (1989) (child shielded); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West Supp.
1991) (defendant may be excluded); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2163a (West Supp. 1991)
(defendant not in child's direct view); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988) (defendant
may be excluded); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 1991) (defendant may be excluded);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1990) (defendant may be excluded); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West Supp. 1992) (child shielded); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(24)
(Supp. 1990) (defendant present); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985 (Purdon Supp. 1991)
(child shielded); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1991) (child shielded); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (child shielded); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 15.5
(defendant may be excluded); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.150 (West Supp. 1991) (de-
fendant may be excluded).
5. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55
(Supp. 1991) (GA. CODE ANN. § 81-1006.2 (Harrison Supp. 1991)); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626
(1985) (HAw. R. EVID. 616) (defendant's presence not to be unduly emphasized); IDAHO
CODE § 19-3024A (Supp. 1991); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp.
1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (Anderson 1987); VT. R. EVID. 807 (transmission of
defendant's image may be disallowed); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (Michie 1988); see also 18
U.S.C.A. § 3509 (West Supp. 1991).
Some argue that the two-way procedure does not raise a Confrontation Clause problem.
See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1023 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Brady v. State, 575
N.E.2d 981, 989 (Ind. 1991) (referring to the Indiana Constitution). Of course, in the United
States, the traditional configuration for a criminal trial includes the accused present in the
courtroom at the counsel table and in the unobstructed view of witnesses, who testify from a
witness stand also in the courtroom. This Article focuses on the one-way procedure, but ex-
amines the various special testimonial procedures that depart from the traditional courtroom
setting and which are designed to protect child witnesses from psychological trauma by shield-
ing the child witness from the physical presence of the defendant.
6. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
7. Id. at 3170.
8. Id. at 3171.
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issue was the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, which provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the ight... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."9 In reaching its decision, the
Court recognized the state's compelling interest in protecting children.' 0
It also relied on social science findings that this special testimonial proce-
dure may actually better serve the truth-seeking function of confronta-
tion than the typical face-to-face meeting because the child will be less
upset and flustered and therefore more communicative when testifying."
Although the Craig Court adopted a "necessity test," requiring a
case-specific showing that the use of one-way closed circuit television is
necessary to avoid trauma to the child, it left a number of questions un-
answered. For example, how can courts and legislatures be sure that
shielding children serves the search for truth? How can they be sure that
they are protecting injured children and not facilitating children who are
lying or otherwise misreporting the facts? Despite its ruling that shield-
ing the child witness does not violate the Confrontation Clause when
there is a case-specific showing of necessity, Craig gives little guidance on
if and when the special testimonial procedures should be invoked. As a
result, state courts and legislatures continue to struggle with these issues.
Some state courts have declined to embrace Craig, concluding instead
that their state constitutions will not tolerate the use of one-way closed
circuit television and the concomitant absence of physical confrontation
between the child witness and the criminal defendant.' 2 In sharp con-
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment applies
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
The Members of Congress who drafted the Bill of Rights apparently included it without de-
bate. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175-76 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Of course,
when the Confrontation Clause was proposed and ratified, television did not exist. See Com-
monwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 230 (Ky. 1986); cf State v. Daniels, 484 So. 2d 941, 944
(La. Ct. App. 1986) ("Admittedly, the United States Supreme Court has used the words 'face
to face' to describe the guarantee of the confrontation clause .... [T]he court's choice of
words may have resulted from its inability to foresee technological developments permitting
cross-examination without physical presence."). In addition, although children were no longer
categorically excluded as witnesses as they had been at early canon law, see 4 W.F. FINLASON,
REEVES' HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 80 (Philadelphia, M. Murphy 1880), they were
nevertheless considered a suspect class of witness, see JOHN E.B. MYERS, CHILD WrrNEsS
LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.3, at 60-61 (1987 & Supp. 1991) (citing Rex v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199,
200, 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 202-03 (1779)); NANCY W. PERRY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN,
THE CHILD WITNESS 37-41 (1991). We can assume, therefore, that the drafters did not con-
sider either the appropriateness of transmitting testimony by closed circuit television or the
special testimonial needs of child witnesses.
10. See Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167-68.
11. Id. at 3169-70; see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1032 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
12. See, e.g., Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981, 989 (Ind. 1991) (use of one-way closed
[Vol. 43
SHIELDING CHILD WITNESSES
trast, some state legislatures have responded to Craig by revising their
statutory law to expand the screening options available to child
witnesses. 13
This Article explores the use of alternative testimonial procedures
that shield child witnesses from criminal defendants. Part I examines
what Craig says about how a prosecutor can demonstrate a child's need
for special testimonial procedures. It also compares the Craig standards
with those developed by the various courts and legislatures that allow
shielding procedures. These sources suggest that the protection of child
witnesses depends on how we balance the needs of the child against the
benefits of confrontation. How we strike that balance depends on what
we know about those needs and benefits in general (as a matter of experi-
ence, common sense, and social science) and in the particular case
(through hearings). Accordingly, Part II considers the reliability of the
social science findings undergirding Craig, and Part III explores the im-
plications of compromising the courtroom confrontation that would
otherwise occur between defendants and child witnesses.
Finally, Part IV proposes legislative change and makes recommen-
dations for exercising judicial discretion. Specifically, this Article argues
that we should maintain traditional adversarial safeguards except in the
most compelling of circumstances, and at least until social science can
provide us with more definitive findings. This Article further posits that
alternative testimonial procedures should be implemented only after the
court conducts a balanced inquiry that considers any case-specific needs
for shielding and for confrontation.
circuit television violated the state constitution, but two-way closed circuit television would
not); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 572 Pa. 472, 474, 594 A.2d 281, 281-82 (1991) (use of one-
way closed circuit television violated the state constitution).
13. For example, California law once provided only for testimony by two-way closed
circuit television. See S. 1216, ch. 828, § 88, 1987-88 Reg. Sess., 1987 Cal. Stat. 2570, 2618-21
(codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1991)). This provision was amended in
1991 to allow for testimony by one-way closed circuit television as well. S. 905, ch. 948, § 1,
1991-92 Reg. Sess., 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3771, 3772-74 (West) (codified at CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1992)).
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I. The Vague Craig Showing of Necessity
Out of the mouth of babes and nursing infants you have perfected
praise.
Matthew 21:16
A. Coy, Precursor to Craig
The Supreme Court first addressed whether special testimonial pro-
cedures could be used in child abuse cases in Coy v. Iowa, 1 4 decided two
years before Craig. The Court in Coy considered an Iowa statute which
included a provision allowing children to testify from behind a screen
that blocked their view of the defendant. 15 The defendant was charged
with sexually assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls while they were
camping out in his neighbor's backyard. The trial court permitted a
large screen to be placed between the defendant and the witness stand
during the girls' testimony. 16 The defendant could dimly see the wit-
nesses through the screen, but the witnesses could not see the defendant
at all.17 The girls testified under oath and were subject to cross-examina-
tion. The screen did not prevent the girls from seeing and being seen by
the judge, counsel, and jury, and it did not prevent the jury from seeing
the defendant's demeanor while the girls testified."' By blocking the
girls' view of the defendant, however, the screen precluded the jury from
observing the girls' demeanor as it might have been had they testified in
the defendant's unobstructed presence.
The defendant in Coy appealed on two grounds: First, that the pro-
cedure violated his Sixth Amendment right to face-to-face confrontation;
and second, that the procedure deprived him of due process of law by
making him appear guilty and thereby eroding the presumption of inno-
cence. 19 The Court held that the defendant's right to face-to-face con-
frontation had been violated. 20 The opinion, delivered by Justice Scalia,
described the "irreducible literal meaning" of the Confrontation Clause
as the" 'right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence
at trial.' "21 The Court acknowledged that "rights conferred by the Con-
14. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
15. Id. at 1014 (citing IovA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West 1987)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1014-15.
18. Id. at 1027 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 1015.
20. Id. at 1022. In light of its ruling on the Confrontation Clause argument, the Court
found it unnecessary to reach the Due Process argument. Id.
21. Id. at 1021 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., con-
curring)) (emphasis added by court).
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frontation Clause are not absolute, and may give way to other important
interests. '22 But it noted that cases so stating have dealt with rights that
are only implied in the Clause (such as the right to cross-examine and the
right to exclude hearsay) and not with "the right narrowly and explicitly
set forth in the Clause."' 23 In seeming contradiction, the Court stated in
dicta that any exceptions to the "irreducible literal meaning" of the Con-
frontation Clause "would surely be allowed only when necessary to fur-
ther an important public policy."'24  The State argued that it had
established necessity because the Iowa statute implied a legislative find-
ing that child witnesses suffer trauma from testifying in their assailant's
presence.25 The Court rejected this argument and indicated that neces-
sity could be shown only after "individualized findings that.., particular
witnesses needed special protection."' 26 Such specific findings had not
been made in Coy.27
B. Craig
In Maryland v. Craig, however, an individualized showing of trauma
had been made to the trial court.28 Craig involved a Maryland statute
that allowed children to testify by one-way closed circuit television if the
judge first found that the child would suffer "serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate" at trial.29 The de-
fendant in Craig was charged with child abuse, first and second degree
sexual offenses, perverted sexual practice, assault, and battery.30 The al-
22. Id. at 1020.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1021. This dicta appears to have been a compromise to hold the swing votes of
Justices O'Connor and White, who joined in a concurring opinion. In the subsequently de-
cided case of Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990), where there were individualized
findings that the child victims would suffer severe trauma, Justice O'Connor (writing for a
majority that included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, and Kennedy)
approved of child testimony by one-way closed circuit television. Id. at 3169-70. Justice Scalia
(joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens) dissented on the ground that the "text of
the Sixth Amendment is clear" and requires face-to-face confrontation. Id. at 3172 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
25. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021.
26. Id.
27. Justice Blackmun, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, trivialized the right
to physical confrontation by describing the defendant's "complaint" as "the very narrow ob-
jection that the girls could not see him while they testified." Id. at 1027 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). He added that the defense enjoyed "unrestricted cross-examination," and that the jury
was able to observe the girls' demeanor as they testified. Id.
28. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3161.
29. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CrS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102(1)(a)(ii) (1989)).
30. Id. at 3160.
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leged victims 3 1 had attended a child care facility owned and operated by
the defendant. 32 After receiving expert testimony, the trial court made
the requisite findings and allowed the children to testify in a separate
room in the presence of the attorneys but outside the presence of the
judge, jury, and defendant, all of whom remained in the courtroom
where a television displayed the children's testimony.33 As with the Iowa
screening procedure used in Coy, the child witnesses testified under oath,
were subject to cross-examination, were observable by the judge, jury,
and defendant (albeit by television), 34 and the jury was able to observe
the defendant's demeanor while the children testified. 35 Also as in Coy,
the child witnesses could not see the defendant while they testified and
the jury consequently could not observe what the children's demeanor
might have been had they testified in the defendant's presence. Unlike
the sitation in Coy, however, the child witnesses in Craig did not testify
in the presence of the judge and jury-with all the officiality and solem-
nity which that might invoke-but rather were separated from the judge
and jury as well as the defendant.
The Craig Court upheld the constitutionality of the Maryland pro-
cedure inasmuch as it required a showing of necessity to protect the par-
ticular child witness and, unlike the Iowa procedure in Coy, did not rely
on a "legislatively imposed presumption of trauma." 36  Justice
O'Connor, writing for a five-member majority, reasoned from cases that
upheld the admission of hearsay statements against a criminal defendant
and denied the defendant a face-to-face meeting with the declarant, and
found that the defendant's right to physical confrontation was not abso-
lute.37 Her opinion further asserted that the state's interest in protecting
31. Several separate indictments were returned against Ms. Craig, but only the indict-
ment involving the child Brooke Etze proceeded to trial. Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 255
n.1, 544 A.2d 784, 786 n.1 (Ct. Spec. App. 1988), rev'd, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989),
vacated, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). Three other children, also allegedly abused by Ms. Craig,
testified at the trial. Id. at 295, 544 A.2d at 806.
32. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3160.
33. Id. at 3161-62.
34. Id. at 3166.
35. Respondent's Brief at 6, Craig (No. 89-478).
36. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3163 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988)). The
Court's holding resembles that of Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596
(1982). In Globe, the Court acknowledged the state's compelling interest in protecting minor
victims of sex crimes from the further trauma and embarrassment of testifying in open court,
but held that a Massachusetts statute barring press and public access to criminal sex-offense
trials during the testimony of minor victims violated the First Amendment because the statute
mandated uniform closure rather than selective closure based on a case-by-case determination
of the particular child's needs. Id. at 607-08, 610-11 & n.27.
37. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3164-66.
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child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case was
sufficiently important to outweigh the right to a face-to-face meeting, "at
least in some cases. ' 38 The question is, in which cases?
C. An Analysis of the Craig Directives
The Craig Court attempted to outline what the state must demon-
strate to make an "adequate showing of necessity. ' 39 In particular, Craig
allows shielding to protect the child witness from trauma caused by the
defendant's presence, at least when that trauma impairs the child's ability
to communicate and is more than de minimis.4° Craig also requires that
the trauma be demonstrated in an evidentiary hearing.41 Nevertheless,
the Court left many questions unanswered by declining to establish any
"categorical evidentiary prerequisites. '42 Craig therefore provides little
guidance to the states, which have widely varying requirements for show-
ing necessity. The various state practices are examined below in light of
the too few and vague Craig directives.
(1) Defendant's Presence Triggers the Trauma
Craig specifies that the trial court must find that the child's trauma
stems from testifying in the physical presence of the defendant, as distin-
guished from the trauma of testifying in the courtroom generally43 (in-
cluding the potentially unnerving effect of the presence of a jury,
courtroom staff, the public, and perhaps the media). The Court reasoned
that in the latter situation, the child's needs can be accommodated with-
out denying the defendant face-to-face confrontation. 44 Although it con-
sidered the source of the trauma critical, the Court concluded that the
Constitution does not require the trial judge either to observe the child's
behavior in the defendant's presence or to try two-way closed circuit tele-
vision before ordering the one-way closed circuit television procedure. 45
The Court thereby sanctioned the sort of predictive evidence presented
by the State in Craig:
38. Id. at 3167.
39. Id. at 3169.
40. Id. at 3169-70.
41. Id. at 3169.
42. Id. at 3171.
43. Id. at 3169.
44. Id. In this situation, the defendant would be present in the testimonial room with the
child and the attorneys, while the judge, jury, and public would remain in the courtroom to
observe the testimony on video monitors. Id.
45. Id. at 3171.
July 1992]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The expert testimony in each case suggested that each child would
have some or considerable dificulty in testifying in Craig's presence.
For example, as to one child, the expert said that what "would cause
him the most anxiety would be to testify in front of Mrs. Craig ......
The child "wouldn't be able to communicate effectively." As to an-
other, an expert said she "would probably stop talking and she would
withdraw and curl up." With respect to two others, the testimony was
that one would "become highly agitated, that he may refuse to talk or
if he did talk, that he would choose his subject regardless of the ques-
tions" while the other would "become extremely timid and unwilling
to talk."'4 6
The Court nevertheless acknowledged that observing the child's be-
havior in the defendant's presence before invoking the special testimonial
procedure "could strengthen the grounds for use of protective meas-
ures."47 Several courts have opted for this type of showing4" rather than
46. Id. at 3161 (quoting Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 568-69, 560 A.2d 1120, 1128-29
(1989)) (omission by court).
47. Id. at 3171.
48. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Ky. 1986) ("When the child
was asked why she would not respond to certain questions, she stated: A. I don't want him-
hurt me.... Q. Somebody here you don't want to see? A. (witness nods affirmatively) Q.
Who's that? A. Uncle Leslie.... Q. Are you going to talk for us? A. I don't want him here.")
(citation omitted) (omissions by court); Wildermuth v. State, 3 10 Md. 496, 524, 530 A.2d 275,
289 (1987) (Personal observation by the judge "should be the rule rather than the exception.");
Commonwealth v. Tufts, 405 Mass. 610, 611-12, 542 N.E.2d 586, 587-88 (1989) (The judge
observed the unresponsiveness of the child on the witness stand in the presence of the jury and
defendants. The judge then observed the child in the lobby outside the defendants' presence
but in the presence of the attorneys, where the child related in detail the abuse he had suf-
fered.); State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 275 (Minn. 1989) (The defendant's presence had a
marked effect on the child's testimony. "Before the defendant was removed, L.C. said nothing
in her testimony to implicate appellant. She denied or could not remember whether appellant
had engaged in the conduct on which he was charged. Only after appellant was excluded did
L.C. say that he 'punched' her in the vaginal area."); State v. Ross, 451 N.W.2d 231, 234
(Minn. Ct. App.) (The child was unresponsive while testifying in the defendant's presence and
then slightly more responsive while testifying outside his physical presence by two-way closed
circuit television.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 109 (1990); State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 370-71,
389 N.W.2d 575, 578 (1986) (After responding to preliminary questions in the defendant's
presence, the child became uncooperative and refused to answer any questions about what had
happened. "The prosecuting attorney then asked if she could show him what happened if all
the people were not there, to which the child replied, 'Yes.'" The child and her therapist were
taken into chambers to resume direct examination. The jury and defendant viewed the exami-
nation on video equipment in the courtroom.); State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 450 (R.I. 1989)
("Once Sally was on the witness stand, she froze with fear and was unable to communicate.");
see also Michael H. Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging
Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 19, 88-89 (1985) [hereinafter
Graham, Indicia of Reliability] ("A dress rehearsal to test Alice's actual unwillingness or in-
ability to testify in Sam's presence will most often be appropriate."). But see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1347(d)(2) (West Supp. 1992) ("Ihe court, in determining the merits of the motion,
shall not compel the minor to testify at the hearing; nor shall the court deny the motion on the
ground that the minor has not testified."); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024A.3(b) (Supp. 1991) (same);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.20.6 (McKinney Supp. 1992) ("the child witness who is alleged
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simply relying on predictive evidence, because a Craig showing requires
at least two predictions-that the child witness will suffer trauma, and
that the defendant's presence will cause the trauma-and predictive evi-
dence is by its very nature speculative.49 It may be difficult to predeter-
mine the cause of any testimonial trauma when so many variables are
operating in the courtroom setting. Testifying in itself might produce
trauma for a child witness who relives the abuse when relating the details
in court.5 ° Testifying in close proximity to twelve jurors or in front of a
large courtroom audience might also traumatize the child witness. In-
deed, the expert testimony in Craig was particularly equivocal in this
regard. As the Maryland Court of Appeals observed:
The difficulty here is that the testimony in this case was not
sharply focused on the effect of the defendant's presence on the child
witnesses. For example, as to one witness, the expert thought the child
"coming into the courtroom where she would be faced with the alleged
perpetrator and a courtroom of strangers would be unable to talk about
what happened to her." As to another: "he would have great diffi-
culty in talking in front of people, particularly in front of Mrs.
Craig ...." With respect to the third child, this dialogue occurred:
Q. What do you think the reaction of Jessie... would be if
brought into the courtroom to testify?
to be vulnerable may not be compelled to testify at such hearing"); State v. Albert, 13 Kan.
App. 2d 671, 676, 778 P.2d 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1989) (The trial court noted: "'I'm very
reluctant to bring in a young child just-just to watch and see if she's [going to] freeze and fall
apart on the stand' and 'I have confidence in the ability and expertise of the mental health
center to be able to make that judgment.' ") (alteration in original).
49. As one authority on child witnesses has noted,
Mental health professionals often provide expert testimony regarding the impact on a
child of testifying in the presence of the defendant. Unfortunately, in some cases,
such expert testimony is almost completely speculation on the part of the expert.
Professionals sometimes offer little more than conclusions which lack meaningful
facts and data upon which the trail [sic] judge can predicate a decision.
MYERs, supra note 9, § 6.4, at 244 (Supp. 1991).
50. Testifying in itself was a traumatic event for the child witnesses in State v. Twist, 528
A.2d 1250 (Me. 1987). There the children's foster parent, who was a qualified expert in the
field of pediatric psychiatry, "testified that when the children arrived at his home they 'acted
out' sexually about 95 percent of the time .... [A]fter they had been in his home for about
three months, this behavior started to subside." The children then testified before the grand
jury, presumably not in the defendant's presence. After they testified before the grand jury, the
children again "began acting out sexually about 90 percent of the time .... It took another
three or four months for the children's sexual behavior to subside after they gave their testi-
mony before the grand jury." The testimonial experience apparently caused the children to
"regress." Id. at 1253. The trial court consequently ordered that the children's testimony be
videotaped in such a manner that the defendant would not be visible to the witnesses. Id. at
1254.
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A. I [think] that she would probably-Jessie would probably
look around and become extremely timid and unwilling to talk.s1
Thus, determining whether the defendant is the source of the child's
trauma promises to be a controversial matter and the subject of much
litigation.
(2) The Child's Diminished Ability to Communicate
In addition to requiring a finding that the defendant's presence
causes the trauma, the Craig Court indicated that at least where the
child's ability to communicate is impaired, special testimonial procedures
are appropriate.52 Thus, Craig addressed something more than the
psychic harm that results from a child testifying in the physical presence
of the alleged assailant. The Maryland statute at issue in Craig requires
the child to be "suffering serious emotional distress such that the child
cannot reasonably communicate" 53 at trial-a specific sort of distress.
The Court approved this statutory feature when it remarked that a child
witness's trauma could override a defendant's right to physical confron-
tation "at least where such trauma would impair the child's ability to
communicate."'5 4 Citing, inter alia, the amicus brief submitted by the
American Psychological Association s5 and the work of Gail S. Good-
man,5 6 a psychologist and child witness advocate, the Court observed:
"[Where face-to-face confrontation causes significant emotional distress
in a child witness, there is evidence that such confrontation would in fact
disserve the Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking goal" 57 inasmuch as
"face-to-face confrontation 'may so overwhelm the child as to prevent
the possibility of effective testimony.' ",58 The Court thereby placed a
premium on obtaining the child witness's testimony and couched its con-
cern in terms of promoting the "truth-seeking goal" of the Confrontation
Clause.59
51. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 569-70, 560 A.2d 1120, 1129 (1989) (emphases, altera-
tions, and omissions by court), vacated, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
52. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3170 (1990).
53. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989).
54. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3170.
55. See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of
Neither Party at 18-24, Craig (No. 89-478), cited with approval in Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169.
56. See Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault: Children's Memory
and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 181, 203-04 (1985) [hereinafter Goodman & Helgeson,
Child Sexual Assault], cited with approval in Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169-70.
57. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169 (emphasis in original).
58. Id. (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1032 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
59. The Court's emphasis on the "truth-seeking goal" of the Confrontation Clause is
problematic and has engendered sharp criticism. See, e.g., Philip Halpern, The Confrontation
Clause and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 165, 200 (1988-89)
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What if the child would suffer mental or emotional injury by testify-
ing in the defendant's presence, but could effectively articulate the details
of the abuse suffered? This is an open question. Craig does not say that a
child witness can be shielded on the basis of trauma alone, but there
certainly is a tension between the Court's truth-seeking and child protec-
tion rationales. The Court specifically declared that "a State's interest in
the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be
sufficiently important to outweigh.., a defendant's right to face his or
her accusers in court." 6 The Court also determined that one-way closed
circuit television is not prohibited by the Confrontation Clause "where
necessary to protect a child witness from trauma that would be caused by
testifying in the physical presence of the defendant, at least where such
trauma would impair the child's ability to communicate. '61 The "at
least" language may indicate that circumstances other than an impaired
ability to communicate can justify the use of one-way closed circuit tele-
vision. It may also connote that an impaired ability to communicate is
the minimal showing required to override the defendant's otherwise con-
trolling right to be confronted with adverse witnesses.
Not surprisingly, the states disagree as to the type of injury that will
suffice. Most statutes focus on the child's inability to communicate. 62
Others recognize both the psychic harm that results from testifying and
the harm that impairs the child's ability to communicate. 63 Some state
("[T]he emphasis on reliability marks a dangerous trend in criminal adjudication. Unqualified
truth concerning facts disputed in litigation cannot consistently, if ever, be attained."); Toni
M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-To-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863, 888
(1988) ("The confrontation guarantee is a defendant-centered right and cannot reasonably be
read as a general assurance of trials based on reliable evidence.").
60. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167.
61. Id. at 3170.
62. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046(a)(2) (1990) ("normal court procedures would
result in the child's inability to effectively communicate"); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55(a)(2)
(Supp. 1991) (GA. CODE ANN. § 81-1006.2(a)(2) (Harrison Supp. 1991)) ("serious emotional
distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434(b)
(Supp. 1991) (to require the child to testify in open court would "so traumatize the child as to
prevent the child from reasonably communicating to the jury"); MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &
JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989) ("serious emotional distress such that the child cannot
reasonably communicate"); VT. R. EVID. 807(c) ("trauma to the child which would substan-
tially impair the ability of the child to testify"); Wyo. STAT. § 7-1 1-408(c)(iii) (1987) (physical
or psychological harm "which would effectively render the child incapable to testify at the
trial").
63. See, e.g., UTAH R. CRii. P. 15.5(2)(a) ("the child will suffer serious emotional or
mental strain if he is required to testify in the defendant's presence, or the child's testimony
will be inherently unreliable if he is required to testify in the defendant's presence"); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-67.9.B (Michie 1988) (the child's persistent refusal to testify, the child's substan-
tial inability to communicate about the offense, or a finding that the child will suffer severe
emotional trauma from so testifying).
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courts, however, emphasize the psychic harm that results from the testi-
monial experience, irrespective of the child's ability to communicate."
It might be argued that the relevant inquiry should focus on the
potential psychic harm to the child witness. This approach identifies
children's welfare as the primary social value at stake, a compelling state
interest emphasized in Craig. This rationale would support screening a
child witness who is traumatized by testifying in the defendant's pres-
ence, regardless of the child's ability to testify in that situation. Never-
theless, as a practical matter it may be difficult to demonstrate that the
defendant's presence harms the child--one of the elements of a Craig
showing-if the child is capable of testifying in the defendant's
presence. 65
Craig also justified the compromise of physical confrontation on the
ground that screening may advance the discovery of truth where child
witnesses are unable to communicate otherwise. Clearly, the truth-seek-
ing rationale would not support screening when the child may suffer
some psychic injury but can effectively testify, because screening is not
necessary to advance the reliability of the proceedings unless the defend-
ant's presence will impair the child's ability to communicate. Neverthe-
less, Craig's focus on the child witness's ability to communicate appears
to be aimed at assisting the prosecution in the presentation of its case-
an arguably less noble purpose than protecting children, and a questiona-
ble basis for compromising a criminal defendant's constitutional right.
It has been argued that physical confrontation makes sense only if it
increases the reliability of a child's testimony.66 Although this approach
64. See, e.g., Thomas v. People, 803 P.2d 144, 150 n.13 (Colo. 1990) (acknowledging that
the Craig opinion is vague on this point, but concluding that the Court's reasoning "suggests
that its holding would apply in cases in which the trauma would be injurious to the child but
would not have the specific adverse effect of impairing the child's ability to communicate");
People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d 249, 265-66, 551 N.E.2d 561, 571, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68, 78 (1990)
(The statute requires more than findings on "the ease with which the child victim is able to
testify or to the usefulness or effectiveness of the testimony the victim is able to give. The
findings must relate to the effect that testifying in court will have on the mental or emotional
well-being of the child.").
65. For instance, the states of Colorado and Mississippi require necessity findings to be
based on specific behavioral indicators exhibited by the child. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-
6-401.3 (West 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 1991). Although these statutes
make important headway in rendering a psychic harm determination less speculative by re-
quiring objectively verifiable criteria, these standards may not satisfy Craig. Such behavioral
indicators might include nightmares, bed-wetting and acting out sexually. But it may be diffi-
cult to demonstrate that the defendant's presence causes the trauma-thus allowing shield-
ing-because presumably these manifestations of psychic trauma are taking place outside the
defendant's presence.
66. See McGOUGH, supra note 2 (manuscript ch. 7, at 7-8).
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may be superior to a pure harm analysis that disregards the asserted
truth-seeking purpose of confrontation, 67 it too is problematic. Ac-
knowledging physical confrontation's role in reducing the risk that a wit-
ness will lie, the Craig Court observed that "face-to-face confrontation
enhances the accuracy of fact-finding by reducing the risk that a witness
will wrongfully implicate an innocent person. ' 68 The Court cited no au-
thority or social science evidence for the proposition that physical con-
frontation does not also decrease the risk of false testimony by child
witnesses, and it made no attempt to resolve the contradiction in its rea-
soning that physical confrontation might at once undermine and enhance
the accuracy of fact-finding when children are witnesses. Perhaps a child
cannot communicate effectively because he or she is silenced by fear of
the defendant, or possibly physical confrontation is inhibiting the com-
munication of a deliberately untruthful or otherwise inaccurate report. 69
Protective procedures might reduce false recantations and stymied deliv-
eries, but facilitate untruthful and otherwise inaccurate accusations. 70
Under these circumstances, to shield is to prejudge the facts because it
facilitates the child's testimony on the assumption that the testimony will
be truthful.71
(3) More Than De Minimis Impairment
In further describing the sort of emotional distress that will suffice
to permit the use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure, the
67. See id. (arguing that the inquiry should focus on the need to enhance the reliability of
the child's account and not on a need to protect the child from courtroom fear and trauma,
since calmly delivered but unreliable testimony would be an unacceptable result for Confronta-
tion Clause purposes).
68. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3164 (1990).
69. See People v. Johnson, 146 Ill. App. 3d 640, 656, 497 N.E.2d 308, 318 (App. Ct.
1986) (Harrison, J., dissenting) ("Their reluctance may have stemmed from fear, embarrass-
ment or guilt as the majority suggests, or it may have been caused because they were not telling
the truth and could not bring themselves to lie in defendant's presence. We cannot be sure."),
rev'd, 118 Ill. 2d 501, 517 N.E.2d 1070 (1987).
70. Cf PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 9, at 196 ("Certainly, we must be aware of
the possibility that protecting children from trauma also may make it easier for them to lie.").
Contra Ellen Forman, Note, To Keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 437, 453, 455 (1989) (stating, as if objectively true, that protecting the child witness
enhances the truth finding function of the courts).
71. See Eldonna M. Ruddock, Case Note, Something More Than A Generalized Finding:
The State's Interest in Protecting Child Sexual Abuse Victims in Maryland v. Craig Outmuscles
the Confrontation Clause, 8 COOLEY L. REv. 389, 405-06 (1991) ("If the child is telling the
truth, the fact-finding process will be better served by making testifying less stressful.... [But
flrom the legal perspective of our traditional criminal jurisprudence, we do not know whether
the child is telling the truth until the trial is over and the verdict rendered.") (footnote
omitted).
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Court added that the trauma must be "more than de minimis, i.e., more
than 'mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify.' "72
The Court declined to specify how much more than a de minimis show-
ing is required, noting only that the Maryland statute, which required a
determination that the child witness will suffer "serious" emotional dis-
tress, "clearly" sufficed. 73
Thus, Craig neglects to provide courts and legislatures with any
meaningful guidance on the quantum of trauma that may trigger the use
of protective procedures. Some statutes are couched in terms of a child's
unavailability to testify otherwise.74 Many statutes require a showing of
serious or severe harm. 75 Others simply call for a showing of harm.76
Only the state of Florida expressly permits shielded testimony on a show-
ing of something less than serious harm.77
It is also unclear how these standards might translate into a child's
ability or inability to communicate-the harm at issue in Craig. What
sort of impairment of a child's ability to communicate should suffice?
We know that mere nervousness, excitement or some reluctance to testify
is not enough. But what about fidgeting? Stammering? Unresponsive-
ness? Recanting? Crying? Whimpering? It has been suggested that a
showing should be made that a child's testimony would be practically
impossible to elicit without the protective procedures.78 This approach
72. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169 (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 524, 530 A.2d
275, 289 (1987)).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b)(2) (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-6-401.3(3) (West 1990) (finding of unavailability should turn "on specific behav-
ioral indicators exhibited by the child"); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024A.2(b) (Supp. 1991); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4)(c) (West 1988); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 8(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1992).
75. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55(a)(2) (Supp. 1991) (GA. CODE ANN. § 81-
1006.2(a)(2) (Harrison Supp. 1991)) (serious); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-
102(a)(1)(ii) (1989) (serious); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4.b (West Supp. 1990) (severe);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.10.1 (McKinney Supp. 1992) (severe); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.41(B)(1)(b) (Anderson 1987) (serious); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(24) (Supp. 1990) (se-
vere); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 15.5(2)(a) (serious); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9.B.3 (Michie 1988)
(severe); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.150(l)(c) (West Supp. 1991) (serious).
76. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509(b)(1)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1991) ("emotional trauma");
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6(d)(3)(A) (Burns Supp. 1991) ("emotional or mental harm");
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991) ("psychological or emo-
tional trauma"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a.I(a) (Supp. 1991) ("emotional or mental
strain"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1991) ("unreasonable and unnecessary mental
or emotional harm").
77. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53(1) (West Supp. 1992) ("at least moderate emotional or
mental harm").
78. Michael L. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523, 560-62 (1988) [here-
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provides for shielding only under the most compelling of circumstances,
yet ensures that the child witness will be heard. It also would be easier to
administer than other approaches, because the prescribed showing is less
ambiguous than one that requires assessing a child's ability to communi-
cate "reasonably" 79 or "effectively," 80 or a child's "substantial" inability
to communicate. 81
(4) The Manner of Proof
The Craig Court held that the finding of necessity must be case-
specific and focus on a particular child's needs, and that "the trial court
must hear evidence" in making that determination. 82 The Court did not
indicate, however, what type of evidence would be required. In support
of its motion to invoke the one-way closed circuit television procedure,
the State in Craig had presented the expert testimony of Mary Burke, a
child therapist, and Dr. Gladys Sweeney, a psychologist.8 3 Both had ex-
tensively counseled the children. 4 Thus, the State's evidence consisted
of the testimony of highly qualified experts who were intimately familiar
with each of their child patients.
inafter Graham, The Confrontation Clause]; Graham, Indicia of Reliability, supra note 48, at
83-84, 95.
79. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1991) (GA. CODE ANN. § 81-1006.2(a)(2)
(Harrison Supp. 1991)); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434(b) (Supp. 1991); MD. CODE ANN., CTs.
& JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989).
80. See, eg., ALAsKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (1990).
81. See, eg., VT. R. EvID. 807(c), (f); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9.B.2 (Michie 1988).
82. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3169 (1990). Several pre-Craig courts had ruled
otherwise, holding that a hearing was not necessary to establish the requisite finding of trauma.
See, eg., People v. Schmitt, 204 Ill. App. 3d 820, 825-26, 562 N.E.2d 377, 382 (App. Ct. 1990)
("[T]he statute does not require a hearing to determine whether the best interest of the child
would be served by allowing him to testify via closed-circuit television.... [T]he representa-
tions of the prosecutor to the court provided a sufficient basis for the finding of the court."),
appeal denied, 137 Ii. 2d 670, 571 N.E.2d 154 (1991); State v. Daniels, 484 So. 2d 941, 943
(La. Ct. App. 1986) ("The procedure as enacted does not require an evidentiary hearing.");
People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d 249, 265, 551 N.E.2d 561, 571, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68, 78 (1990)
("[T]he statute does not specify that a hearing is required .... But given the high threshold
established by the statute for the protection of a defendant's confrontational rights, an article
65 order will ordinarily require testimony in a hearing.. . ."). The Maryland statute under
review in Craig also did not explicitly require a hearing.
83. Brief for Petitioner at 5, 7, Craig (No. 89-478). "Ms. Burke held a Bachelor's Degree
in Child Behavior and Development and a Master's Degree in Counseling Psychology and
Human Development. She had been working full time with abused children since 1981, pro-
viding victims and their families with counseling and support services." Id. at 5 n.5 (citation
omitted). "Dr. Sweeney held a Ph.D. in Counseling Psychology and a Master's Degree in
Rehabilitation Counseling. She was formerly a faculty member of the Johns Hopkins School
of Medicine's Department of Child Psychiatry." Id. at 7 n.8 (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 5-8.
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Craig left two questions open: Is expert opinion necessary? And if
not, who else may render an opinion on the needs of a particular child?
The state of Oregon, for example, specifically provides by statute that
proof of trauma must be shown by expert testimony.85 Other statutes
identify expert testimony as one method, among others, of demonstrating
the requisite trauma.8 6 Moreover, statutory law regarding the role of ex-
pert testimony is complemented (or perhaps complicated) by decisional
law. Some courts have concluded that expert testimony is not neces-
sary;8 7 others, that it may be necessary.88 In the vast majority of cases,
however, expert testimony is presented.89
Despite this trend, some courts also look to a few other sources,
such as parents and grandparents, in determining if the requisite showing
is made.90 The American Psychological Association believes that scien-
85. OR. REv. STAT. § 40.460(24) (Supp. 1990).
86. See, eg., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (West Supp. 1991) (expressly requiring
expert testimony to establish a substantial likelihood of emotional trauma from testifying, but
not requiring expert testimony to establish the child's inability to testify because of "fear");
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-413(3) (West 1990) ("Such finding shall be based on, but not
be limited to, recommendations from the child's therapist or any other person having direct
contact with the child .. "); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8(e)(1)(B)(ii) (Bums Supp. 1991)
(allowing the testimony of a physician or psychologist to establish a substantial likelihood of
emotional or mental harm from testifying, and alternatively allowing "evidence" of the effect
upon the child of testifying in court); N.Y. C~iM. PROC. LAw § 65.20.7(a) (McKinney Supp.
1992) ("any physician, psychologist, nurse or social worker who has treated a child witness
may testify"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9.B (Michie 1988) (expressly requiring expert testi-
mony to establish a substantial likelihood of severe emotional trauma from testifying, but not
requiring expert testimony to establish the child's substantial inability to communicate about
the offense).
87. See, eg., Washington v. State, 452 So. 2d 82, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Wilder-
muth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 524, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (1987).
88. See, e.g., State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 1989) (expert testimony
"may be necessary where the cause of the child's testimonial difficulties and trauma is not
clear"); State v. Sorenson, 152 Wis. 2d 471, 486, 449 N.W.2d 280, 286 (1989) (medical basis
necessary "absent a disabling emotional breakdown on the stand").
89. See, e.g., Thomas v. People, 803 P.2d 144, 149 (Colo. 1990) (experts who had inter-
viewed the children); Leggett v. State, 565 So. 2d 315, 316-17 (Fla. 1990) ("a licensed, well-
trained, and experienced clinical social worker who had counseled the child at weekly intervals
for more than a year"); State v. Albert, 13 Kan. App. 2d 671, 672-73, 778 P.2d 386, 387 (Ct.
App. 1989) (a clinical social worker who counseled the child); State v. Twist, 528 A.2d 1250,
1253 (Me. 1987) (The state presented the testimony of the children's foster parent, who was a
medical doctor and a qualified expert in the field of pediatric psychiatry.); People v. Guce, 164
A.D.2d 946, 947-48, 560 N.Y.S.2d 53, 56 (App. Div.) ("a certified social worker who special-
ized in working with sexually abused children and their families"), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d
986, 565 N.E.2d 524, 563 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1990); State v. Self, 56 Ohio St. 3d 73, 74, 564 N.E.2d
446, 448 (1990) (the child's psychotherapist); State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 450 (R.I. 1989)
("[B]oth the State's expert and the defense's expert performed a psychological examination of
Sally.").
90. See, e.g., McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 391, 706 S.W.2d 360, 361 (1986) (The
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tific knowledge of child abuse dynamics can adequately inform a deter-
mination of the need to shield a particular child witness. 91 It concedes,
however, that the testimony of an expert witness might appropriately be
"bolstered" with testimony from parents, teachers, or others who have
had an opportunity to observe the child.92
Other related issues include whether to use court-appointed experts
and whether to allow defense experts to have access to the child witness
for purposes of psychological or psychiatric examination. 93 On the one
hand, the Nebraska statute provides that "[t]he court may order an in-
dependent examination by a psychologist or psychiatrist if the defense
requests the opportunity to rebut" the prosecution's showing of neces-
sity.94 On the other hand, New York's law states that the child may not
be compelled to submit to a psychological or psychiatric examination. 95
It would seem, however, that in order for the defense to counter the pros-
ecution's showing-which typically will rely on expert evaluation of the
child-the defense may need to have its own expert evaluate the child.
victim's grandparents testified.); Chappell v. State, 18 Ark. App. 26, 32-33, 710 S.W.2d 214,
216-17 (Ct. App. 1986) (The trial court received the testimony of a caseworker for Arkansas
Social Services. She had no specialized training in dealing with victims of sexual abuse but saw
the victim for over seven months, at least once a week.); State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359,
371, 556 A.2d 112, 120 ("It is well settled that a nonexpert witness may testify as to his
impression of another's mental or emotional state if that opinion is reliable and based on the
witness's observations."), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 322 (1989); State v. Darby, 19 Conn. App.
445, 454, 563 A.2d 710, 714 (App. Ct.) ("[W]e are not restricted solely to reviewing the expert
testimony on this issue, but may consider the relevant testimony of lay witnesses as well."),
appeal denied, 213 Conn. 801, 567 A.2d 833 (1989); State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 353, 353
S.E.2d 451, 452 (1987) ("Before ruling on the motion, the trial judge talked with the victim
and her mother in chambers. The mother stated that the child was afraid of Cooper .... The
child also expressed her fear of Cooper to the judge.").
91. See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of
Neither Party at 17, Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (No. 89-478). The APA's
amicus brief in Craig identifies four relevant factors: traumatic sexualization (whether the
abuse involved the use of force); betrayal (whether the child was vitally dependent on the
alleged abuser); powerlessness (whether and how the child was coerced or manipulated); and
stigmatization (whether the child experienced shame and guilt about the abuse). Id. at 15-16.
92. Id. at 17.
93. See, eg., State v. McCutcheon, 234 N.J. Super. 434,443, 560 A.2d 1303, 1308 (Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1988) (Because it did not find the prosecution's expert testimony to be "particu-
larly conclusive," the court ordered that the child be evaluated by a psychiatrist.); State v.
Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 450 (R.I. 1989) (Both the state's expert and the defense's expert per-
formed a psychological examination of the child. The state presented Dr. Barry Nurcombe,
M.D. Although the child did meet with a defense psychiatrist, his or her testimony was not
presented.). But see, eg., Gilpin v. McCormick, 921 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1990) (A victim
or witness may volunteer to be examined by a psychiatrist for the state, but "since the state
does not possess the authority to compel examination, the defense lacks no reciprocal author-
ity, and there [is] no denial of due process.").
94. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1926(9) (1989).
95. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.20.6 (McKinney Supp. 1992).
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Moreover, to the extent that the prosecution's expert witness has
also been in a therapeutic or other relationship with the child, his or her
testimony may be biased.96 Indeed, therapy for suspected child abuse
victims is typically "feeling-expressive... [and] may well have the effect
of teaching a child to be afraid of a defendant. ' 97 This sort of therapy
often entails "talking about how bad the defendant is, hitting a bobo doll
identified as the defendant, drawing pictures of the defendant and burn-
ing them, making clay figures of the defendant and putting them in jail,
or throwing darts at a picture of the defendant."98 This type of therapy
may engender bias in the therapist who later serves as his or her client's
expert witness, giving rise to the need for a neutral or defense-retained
expert.
Craig also did not discuss the standard of proof to be applied. Seven
state statutes, however, do include standard of proof provisions. Five of
these require the judge to apply a "clear and convincing" evidence stan-
dard,99 while two call for a "preponderance" of the evidence standard. ' oo
Most statutes do not explicitly provide for a standard of proof, but some
require a showing of "substantial likelihood" of harm,10 1 and at least one
96. See, e.g., State v. Self, 56 Ohio St. 3d 73, 80, 546 N.E.2d 446, 454 (1990) (Appellee
argued that the expert's testimony was not credible due to bias caused by her "therapeutic
relationship" with the child and further argued that the court should have appointed an in-
dependent expert to evaluate the child.).
97. Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for Psychological Therapies in Support of Sandra
Ann Craig, Respondent at 22, Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (No. 89-478).
98. Id. at 23.
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b)(2) (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
86g(a) (West Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024A.2(b) (Supp. 1991); ICAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-3434(b) (Supp. 1991); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.10.1 (McIKinney Supp. 1992).
100. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 517:13-a.I (Supp. 1991).
101. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (West Supp. 1991) (requiring "a substan-
tial likelihood, as established by expert testimony," of "emotional trauma," but setting no
standard for a court's finding that "fear" prevents the child from testifying); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 92.53(1), 92.54(1) (West Supp. 1992) ("a substantial likelihood" of "at least moderate emo-
tional or mental harm"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8(e)(1)(B)(i), (iii) (Bums Supp. 1991)
(either an expert has certified or a court finds it more likely than not that there is "a substantial
likelihood of emotional or mental harm"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405(4) (Supp. 1991) ("a
substantial likelihood of traumatic emotional or mental distress"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-
32.4.b (West Supp. 1990) ("An order under this section may be made only if the court finds
that the witness is 16 years of age or younger and that there is a substantial likelihood that the
witness would suffer severe emotional or mental distress . . . ."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.41(E)(3) (Anderson 1987) (a "substantial likelihood that the child victim will suffer
serious emotional trauma"); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(24) (Supp. 1990) (a "substantial likeli-
hood, established by expert testimony, that the child will suffer severe emotional trauma"); VT.
R. EVID. 807(c) ("only upon a finding that requiring the child to testify in court will present a
substantial risk of trauma to the child"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9.B.3 (Michie 1988) (a
"substantial likelihood, based on expert opinion testimony, that the child will suffer severe
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court has concluded that such language (and other language of similar
strength) requires "clear and convincing" evidence.102 Another state
court has concluded that testimony could be taken outside the presence
of the jury (but in the presence of the defendant) only where the requisite
showing was made beyond a reasonable doubt.10 3
In conclusion, by leaving open a number of practical issues, Craig
creates uncertainty as to when special testimonial procedures are appro-
priate. What kind and amount of trauma is necessary before special pro-
cedures are invoked? Is psychological harm to the child sufficient, or
does the harm have to impair the child's ability to communicate? How
convinced must the court be of the requisite harm to the child? Should
expert testimony be required? Is predictive evidence of a child's trauma
advisable, or would actual confrontation with the defendant be a more
appropriate means of determining whether special testimonial procedures
are necessary?
Underlying all of these issues is the fundamental matter of whether
the purposes of the Confrontation Clause can be served through special
testimonial procedures. Central to this concern is whether the Court was
correct in relying on social science literature to support the proposition
that truth-seeking is better advanced by shielding the child witness than
by requiring the child to testify in a confrontational setting. Accord-
ingly, Part II discusses the role of social science in shaping the law of
confrontation in child abuse cases. It is also essential to analyze what the
loss of physical confrontation through the use of one-way closed circuit
television means to the defendant at trial and to the jury that must assess
the evidence. Part III therefore illustrates the problems associated with
compromising physical confrontation, including the possibility that the
seemingly narrow exception for children will lead to exceptions for adults
emotional trauma"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.150(1)(c) (West Supp. 1991) (court
may make order if it finds by "substantial evidence" that requiring the child to testify in the
presence of the defendant will cause the child to suffer "serious" emotional or mental distress).
102. In State ex rel. B.F., 230 N.J. Super. 153, 553 A.2d 40 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989),
the court held that where the defendant objects to the alternative statutory procedure,
the party seeking the statutory alternative should carry the burden of satisfying the
statutory criteria by "clear and convincing" evidence. We hold that this conclusion
necessarily follows because of the importance historically attached to face-to-face
confrontation as documented by Justice Scalia in Coy, as well as, by reason of the
Legislature's use of language ....
Id. at 159, 553 A.2d at 43. See also State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 453 (R.I. 1989) ("Because
the right to be physically present during the victim's testimony is a core value under the Con-
frontation Clause of the Rhode Island Constitution .... [the harm] must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence.").




in various situations, and the impact that compromise will have on both
the defendant's ability to defend and the reliability of jury verdicts-even
if the compromise of physical confrontation is limited to cases where
children are witnesses.
II. The Reliability of the Social Science Evidence
... then we will no longer be infants tossed back and forth by the
waves and blown here and there by every wind of teaching and by the
cunning and craftiness of men and their deceitful scheming.
Ephesians 4:14
Craig is not the only Supreme Court case to appeal to social science
evidence on the matter of protective child witness procedures. In Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 104 the Court reviewed a Massachusetts
statute requiring the exclusion of the press and general public from the
courtroom during the testimony of child victims of sexual abuse. One of
the Commonwealth's asserted interests in Globe was to encourage minor
victims of sex crimes to come forward and provide accurate testimony.105
The Court rejected this assertion:
The Commonwealth has offered no empirical support for the claim
that the rule of automatic closure... will lead to an increase in the
number of minor sex victims coming forward and cooperating with
state authorities. Not only is the claim speculative in empirical terms,
but it is also open to serious question as a matter of logic and common
sense. 106
Most modem scholars would agree that some reliance on empirical
evidence is inevitable and necessary in constitutional law. 107 When and
to what degree such reliance is justified is a different question. The Craig
104. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
105. Id. at 609.
106. Id. at 609-10 (footnote omitted).
107. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding" Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 612 (1991)
("[E]mpirical research compels the Court to face up to the ramifications of its constitutional
law-making."); Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SuP. Cr.
REV. 75, 100 (In the seminal article on the subject, Professor Karst notes: "When the judge
must make a decision 'about scientific or social processes' he [or she] needs expert help.")
(footnote omitted); John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluat-
ing, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477,477 (1986) ("Once hereti-
cal, the belief that empirical studies can influence the content of legal doctrine is now one of
the few points of general agreement among jurists."); Rachel N. Pine, Speculation and Reality:
The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. Rav. 655, 657
(1988) ("[S]tandards of constitutionality should be informed by empirical truth .... ); Fred C.
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality I" Is Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REv.
601, 602 (1990) (Based on a survey of lawyers and clients, the author advocates further empiri-
cal study of the rationales for confidentiality.).
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Court relied on social science findings in concluding that shielding child
witnesses may further truth-seeking better than physical confrontation.
We must ask: When is it appropriate to rely on specific empirical evi-
dence,108 and in particular, was the Craig Court's reliance on the social
science evidence justified? Only to the extent that we have confidence in
the social science data on child witnesses can we have confidence in the
shielding procedures developed from that data.
Some social science evidence suggests that a child's ability to testify
may be impaired by the traditional courtroom setting. For instance, in
reporting the results of a study that examined the effects of criminal
court testimony on a sample of 218 alleged child sexual assault victims,
psychologist and child witness advocate Gail S. Goodman observed:
[C]hildren's attitudes about testifying in front of the defendant were
reliably associated with their ability to answer the prosecutors' ques-
tions... and to provide a detailed response when they did answer ....
The children who were most upset about testifying in front of the de-
fendant had a more difficult time answering the prosecutors'
questions. 109
Other studies have resulted in similar observations. In a Michigan
study involving seventeen girls and twenty boys between the ages of
seven and nine, the children watched a simulated father-daughter con-
frontation on videotape. 110 Half the children were questioned by an un-
familiar male interviewer in a private setting. The other half were
questioned by two "attorneys" in a courtroom. A "judge" presided over
the proceedings, and the ill-tempered father in the videotape sat at coun-
sel's table.1
The results[,] . . . which either indicated a trend toward, or actually
attained statistical significance, indicated that, compared to children in
a courtroom, children in a small room tend to (1) relate more central
108. See Monahan & Walker, supra note 107, at 498-512 (proposing a method by which
courts may evaluate social science research); Zacharias, supra note 107, at 634 n.168 (acknowl-
edging "a danger that courts will rely on empirical evidence that is not scientifically sound").
109. Gail S. Goodman, The Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault Victims of Testify-
ing in Criminal Court 90 (1989) (Final Report Submitted to the National Institute of Justice,
on file with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter Goodman, Emotional Effects]. The signifi-
cance of these findings is not clear in light of Craig's reliability rationale. We cannot be sure
that all the children who had difficulty testifying had been abused or, if they had, that the
defendant was the culprit. The Confrontation Clause is concerned with the reliability of the
proceedings. That children were more or less communicative in a confrontational setting is
not particularly telling, because confrontation might inhibit true and false reports of abuse. If
the confrontational setting inhibits a false report, then the setting is accomplishing its intended
purpose.
110. Paula E. Hill & Samuel M. Hill, Note, Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empiri-
cal View, 85 MICH. L. REv. 809, 814 & n.19 (1987).
111. Id. at 814 n.20.
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items in free recall; (2) answer specific questions correctly more often;
and (3) say "I don't know" or give no answer when asked specific
questions significantly less often.1 12
Along the same vein, a study by Douglas P. Peters concluded that "child
witness-defendant confrontations can have a substantial negative effect
on the child's ability or willingness to be accurate." 113 Half the children
in this study witnessed a simulated theft of money and, to identify the
perpetrator, later viewed either a photograph lineup or a live lineup. 114
The responses of children who viewed a target-present photograph lineup
were seventy-five percent correct, and eight percent were false non-iden-
tifications (that is, the child incorrectly asserted that the "thief' was not
in the lineup).115 The responses of children who viewed a target-present
live lineup were thirty-three percent correct, and fifty-eight percent were
false non-identifications. 116 These studies suggest that five, in-court testi-
mony by children in the defendant's presence may be unreliable because
such presence may impair the child's ability to communicate and pro-
mote inaccurate testimony.
Empirical data is seductive because it holds the promise of objective
truth. Relying on particular social science evidence to shape the law of
confrontation may nevertheless be inappropriate for at least four reasons:
The data may lack ecological validity; the leading experts may disagree
on the conclusions that can be drawn from the data; the scientist may
lack objectivity; and the research may fail to answer significant, relevant
questions.
112. Id. at 814-15 (footnotes omitted). Again, the significance of these findings is unclear.
Craig, however, is clear that shielding the child witness from the defendant will not be allowed
unless the defendant's presence causes the trauma. Although we can be sure that the children
in the small room were testifying more accurately than those in the courtroom because their
testimony can be compared to the film, we cannot be sure which courtroom variable impaired
the children's ability to communicate. The presence in the courtroom of the ill-tempered fa-
ther from the film may have impaired the testimony of some, but the physical setting of the
courtroom and the presence of a judge and lawyers may have made the difference for others.
113. Douglas P. Peters, The Influence of Stress and Arousal on the Child Witness, in THE
SUGGESTIBILrr OF CHILDREN'S RECOLLECTIONS 60, 75 (John L. Doris ed., 1991).
114. Id. at 68.
115. Id. at 69.
116. Id. The study is particularly interesting for two reasons: We can be sure which chil-
dren were reporting more accurately because their reports can be compared to the staged
events; and the defendant's physical presence appears to be isolated as the controlling variable.
However, the experiment does not provide the child witness with any motive to accuse falsely,
so we do not know if the confrontational setting inhibits false reports as well as truthful re-
ports. It is, nevertheless, interesting to note that there were fewer false identifications (where
the child incorrectly asserted that the thief was in the lineup) when children viewed live line-
ups. Id. at 69.
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First, the relevance of social science evidence depends on its ecologi-
cal validity-the ability to generalize from the research context to condi-
tions in the "real world." 117 It has been argued that before research
findings can appropriately be generalized to some real-world context, a
comparison should demonstrate that the research context is the social,
cognitive, and emotional equivalent of the real-world context. 118
For example, Gail Goodman has been critical of studies that pur-
port to demonstrate the suggestibility of children in abuse investiga-
tions.1 19 She theorizes and attempts to demonstrate in her research that
children are not suggestible when they are participants in activities of
personal significance to them, such as traumatic experiences.' 20 Based
on this hypothesis, Goodman has criticized experimentation that exam-
ines the suggestibility of children as spectators (i.e., where children were
questioned after observing a film or staged event).' 21 Instead, Goodman
devised experiments that examine children who are physically handled
by others, sometimes under traumatic conditions, but in circumstances
that better approximate child sexual abuse conditions. 22 In one such
experiment, the children were introduced to a male confederate with
whom they engaged in the following activities: playing "Simon Says"
117. Stephen J. Ceci, Some Overarching Issues in the Children's Suggestibility Debate in
THE SUGGESTIBILrrY OF CHILDREN'S RECOLLECTIONS, supra note 113, at 1, 3 [hereinafter
Ceci, Overarching Issues].
Moreover, in the quest for ecological validity, social scientists are bound by ethical con-
siderations. For instance, although one theory suggests that children may be particularly sub-
ject to pressure from one parent to implicate the other parent in sexual abuse during divorce
and custody proceedings, social scientists have concluded that it would be unethical to involve
young children in a situation where they are encouraged to tell a lie by one of their parents.
See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Haugaard et al., Children's Definitions of the Truth and Their Competency
as Witnesses in Legal Proceedings; 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 269 (1991). Similarly,
although crimes against children are often traumatic, it would be unethical to terrorize chil-
dren for clinical purposes. Gail S. Goodman et al., Child Sexual and Physical Abuse: Chil-
dren's Testimony, in CHILDREN'S EYEwrn ss MEMORY 1, 7 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds.,
1987) [hereinafter Goodman et al., Child Sexual and Physical Abuse].
118. See John C. Yuille & Gary L. Wells, Concerns about the Application of Research
Findings: The Issue of Ecological Validity, in THE SUGGESTIBILrrY OF CHILDREN'S RECOL-
LEC'nONS, supra note 113, at 118, 122.
119. See Gail S. Goodman et al., Children's Concerns and Memory: Issues of Ecological
Validity in the Study of Children's Eyewitness Testimony, in KNOWING AND REMEMBERING
IN YOUNG CHILDREN 249 (Robyn Fivush & Judith A. Hudson eds., 1990) [hereinafter Good-
man et al., Children's Concerns] (arguing that former research on children's testimony is likely
to have underestimated the ability of children to provide accurate reports).
120. See id. at 258-67; Goodman et al., Child Sexual and Physical Abuse, supra note 117,
at 12.
121. See Goodman et al., Children's Concerns, supra note 119, at 256-57.
122. See id. at 258-67, 271-77; Goodman et al., Child Sexual and Physical Abuse, supra
note 117, at 11-19.
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and in the course of the game touching each other's knees, dressing the
child in a clown costume that was placed over the child's clothes, lifting
the child onto a table and photographing the child, thumb wrestling, and
playing a game that involved such actions as the child tickling the con-
federate.123 In other, more notable experiments, Goodman studied chil-
dren following the more stressful experiences of having blood drawn and
receiving inoculations. 124
With an eye toward finding false reports of abuse, the children were
questioned about the events they had experienced at some point after
each of the manipulations. 125 In an effort to ensure ecological validity,
an attempt was made to ask questions similar to those asked in abuse
investigations. 126 In the study where the children engaged in various ac-
tivities with a male confederate, Goodman observed that the children
"evidenced considerable accuracy in answering specific abuse questions
and even in resisting strongly worded suggestions about actions associ-
ated with abuse." 127 In those studies involving venipuncture and inocu-
lations, Goodman observed that "across the studies, children never made
up false stories of abuse even when asked questions that might foster
such reports."1 28
In yet another effort to achieve improved ecological validity, Karen
Saywitz, Gail Goodman, and others conducted an experiment in which
five- and seven-year-old girls received physical examinations.1 29 Midway
through the exam, half of the children received genital and anal examina-
tions, while the other half received examinations for scoliosis (curvature
123. Goodman et al., Children's Concerns, supra note 119, at 259-60.
124. Goodman et al., Child Sexual and Physical Abuse, supra note 117, at 12-19. The
researchers did not impose the medical procedures on the children; rather, the children had
been previously scheduled for the procedures. Id. at 12.
125. Id. at 13-16; Goodman et al., Children's Concerns, supra note 119, at 260.
126. Goodman et al., Child Sexual and Physical Abuse, supra note 117, at 9, 17; Goodman
et al., Children's Concerns, supra note 119, at 260.
127. Goodman et al., Children's Concerns, supra note 119, at 266. The seven-year-olds
answered 93% of the "abuse" questions correctly, and the four-year-olds answered 83% cor-
rectly. Id. at 262. "Commission" errors (saying that something occurred when it actually did
not), as opposed to "omission" errors (neglecting to report something that did occur), were
rare. Id. at 262-65.
128. Goodman et al., Child Sexual and Physical Abuse, supra note 117, at 18.
129. Karen Saywitz et al., Children's Memories of Genital Examinations: Implications for
Cases of Child Sexual Assault 2-3 (April 1989) (paper presented at the meeting of the Society
for Research on Child Development, Kansas City, Mo., on fie Ath the Hastings Law
Journal).
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of the spine).130 These children also proved highly resistant to suggestive
questioning.13'
Notwithstanding the noteworthy attempts at ecological validity rep-
resented in this research, psychologist Stephen Ceci cautions against tak-
ing the leap of faith and concluding that children simply do not lie about
sexual abuse. 132 Rather, Ceci argues that the research lacks ecological
validity because the experiments do not provide the children with any
motivation to lie. 133 He writes:
Unlike the real world of sexual abuse, there are no motives at work in
these studies that could prompt children to commit errors, that is no
inducements, bribes, threats, or worries. What then do these studies
tell us about children's suggestibility? It seems that the message is a
clear and potentially important one: children may be resistant to mis-
leading questions when there is no motivation to distort the truth, and
when the truth is less threatening than a distortion.' 34
Ceci's research examines specifically what might motivate children
to lie. In one case study involving three- to four-year-old children, sev-
eral researchers cultivated close relationships with the children over a
period of twenty hours.' 35 The children were then included in several
experiments exploring distinct motivations. The first experiment ex-
plored the motivation to protect a loved one. There the beloved re-
searcher pretends to break a forbidden toy and exclaims, "I hope I don't
get into trouble!" The second experiment explored the motivation to lie
for personal aggrandizement. In this manipulation, the beloved re-
searcher asks the child to pick up some building blocks and then leaves.
During her absence, another person enters the room and picks up all the
blocks. The child is subsequently informed that whoever picked up the
130. Id. at 3.
131. Id. at 8-9. Three children in the scoliosis condition falsely claimed that the doctor
had touched their genitals or buttocks. Although two of them could not provide details on
further questioning, one child described being touched on the buttocks with "a long stick,"
noting that "it tickled." Id. at 8. This false-positive report demonstates that suggestive ques-
tioning can lead to false allegations of the sort that may prompt a child abuse investigation.
132. See Stephen J. Ceci et al., The Suggestibility of ChildrenIs Recollections, in CHILD
ABUsE, CHILD DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY (Dante Cicchetti & Sheree Toth eds.,
forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at 4-5, on file with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter Ceci
et al., Suggestibility].
133. Id. (manuscript at 4-5, 9). Goodman concedes as much when she notes, "the chil-
dren had no reason to lie to us as they might if they were trying to protect a loved one,"
Goodman et al., Children's Concerns, supra note 119, at 280, and, it might be added, if they
had been coached by a malevolent loved one. See also Saywitz et al., supra note 129, at 9
("Although this study is an attempt at ecological validity... children in the scoiosis condition
did not have a motive to lie to the interviewer.").
134. Ceci et al., Suggestibility, supra note 132 (manuscript at 9).
135. Id. (manuscript at 19).
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blocks will receive a prize. In the third experiment, the motivation to
sustain a game is explored. The beloved researcher pretends to find a
watch and tells the child that they are going to play a secret game of
hiding the watch from its owner. The fourth experiment explored the
desire to avoid embarrassment. In this manipulation, the children were
kissed by a parent while they were bathed and dressed. The next day, the
children were informed that it was very bad to let someone dss them
when they were naked. They were later told that it was not bad to be
kissed by a parent. In a second case study involving a larger group of
nursery school children, the children played musical chairs and hot po-
tato. During the experiment, which was designed to explore lying for
personal aggrandizement and lying to protect a loved one, a researcher
who had developed an affectionate bond with most of the children pre-
tended to break the tape recorder that was required to play the games.13 6
Following the various experiments in both studies, the children were
questioned about what had transpired.137 Ceci aclowledged that none
of the experiments "were even remotely reminiscent of the powerful emo-
tional and material pressures which are often placed on children who
testify in court proceedings."1 38 He nevertheless concluded that "chil-
dren will indeed consciously and willingly distort the truth, given the
proper motivations."13 9 In fact, over fifty percent of the nursery school
children lied to obtain a gumball. 14°
136. Id. (manuscript at 19-21).
137. Id.
138. Id. (manuscript at 23). Indeed, in child abuse proceedings, myriad motivations might
come into play. For instance, a child might be coaxed by well-meaning adults who offer incen-
tives, like prizes, to tell a story of abuse. A child might tell a story of abuse to obtain liberation
from what may seem like a never-ending series of grueling interviews by looming authority
figures. A child might not understand a father's accusations about a stepfather or a mother's
accusations about an estranged father, but may want to please the parent by echoing their
claims (or may fear their parent's disapproval if they do not). A child might also be embar-
rassed or afraid to tell, or fear losing a parent if they do tell.
139. Id. Ceci observed that "not all motivations produced lying." Id. For example, an-
other experiment considered whether children would distort facts in response to a stereotyp2.
In this manipulation, the children were introduced to "Harry," who was portrayed as bum-
bling, thoughtless, and prone to break things that did not belong to him. Id. (manuscript at
22). On the day that "Harry" visited the nursery school, a tape recorder was broken by a
beloved researcher, and the children observed "Harry" playing with a large coin bank. The
children were subsequently interrogated about the condition of these and other items in the
room. Ceci's initial findings indicate that the children were "quite resistant to conforming to
the Harry stereotype." Id. (manuscript at 23).
140. Id. (manuscript at 23). Professor Ceci has indicated that a complete analysis of the
motivational manipulations awaits further study. Letter from Professor Stephen J. Ceci, Cor-
nell University, College of Human Ecology, Department of Human Development & Family
Studies, to Professor Jean Montoya, University of San Diego School of Law 2 (Nov. 13, 1991)
(on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
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This examination of Goodman's and Ceci's research demonstrates
that the ability of social science to tell us about the real world, including
the world of child witnesses, may be limited. Its value will depend on the
ability of researchers to approximate the various dimensions of the real-
world context in their experiments, because the data may turn on which
real-world variables are manipulated and which ignored. Douglas Pe-
ters, for instance, obtained startling results about the way child witnesses
reacted to being confronted with the "thief" in his experiment. 141 It
might be argued on the basis of Peters' results that child witnesses must
be shielded from criminal defendants because a confrontational setting
significantly increases the likelihood that a child witness will fail to ac-
cuse the criminal. However, without more it may be inappropriate to to
draw that conclusion, because the confrontational setting in the experi-
ment cannot be compared to a courtroom setting. In the study, children
who witnessed the simulated theft were presented with five lineup sus-
pects or five color photos only two minutes after the "theft." 142 This
obviously was a highly stressful situation. Court proceedings rarely, if
ever, follow a crime report this quickly. Usually days and maybe even
weeks intervene between a crime report and a court proceeding. More-
over, the protective trappings of a traditional courtroom-such as the
presence of a judge and bailiff and the furniture that normally separates a
witness from the other courtroom players-apparently were not dupli-
cated in this experiment, and the child witnesses certainly did not enjoy
the benefit of any witness preparation in the time between observing the
simulated theft and being confronted with the "thief."
A second reason why it may be inappropriate to rely on particular
social science evidence in shaping confrontation is that its relevance also
turns on there being a consensus among the experts.1 43 It is particularly
striking that two respected social scientists in the field of developmental
psychology could reach seemingly opposite conclusions: Goodman, that
children generally will not make false reports of sexual abuse;144 and
141. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
142. Peters, supra note 113, at 68.
143. See J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme
Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 144, 167 (1990) (criticizing the Supreme Court's fail-
ure to assimilate social science evidence, but the analysis assumes that the evidence to be as-
similated is supported by a consensus of expert opinion). But cf Paul C. Giannelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1250 (1980) (arguing that the requirement of Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), that novel scientific techniques be generally accepted by the relevant
scientific community, is an unworkable standard).
144. Gail S. Goodman & Alison Clarke-Stewart, Suggestibility in Children's Testimony:
Implicationsfor Sexual Abuse Investigations, in THE SUGGESTIBILrrY OF CHILDREN'S RECOL-
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Ceci, that "children often will lie when the motivational structure is
tilted toward lying." 145
Under the circumstances, it is no wonder that the Craig Court di-
vided over the import of the social science literature. The Craig majority
observed:
To be sure, face-to-face confrontation may be said to cause
trauma for the very purpose of eliciting truth ... [but] where face-to-
face confrontation causes significant emotional distress in a child wit-
ness, there is evidence that such confrontation would in fact disserve
the Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking goal.146
Just as assuredly the dissent responded:
The "special" reasons that exist for suspending one of the usual guar-
antees of reliability in the case of children's testimony are perhaps
matched by "special" reasons for being particularly insistent upon it in
the case of children's testimony. Some studies show that children are
substantially more vulnerable to suggestion than adults, and often un-
able to separate recollected fantasy (or suggestion) from reality. 147
The Craig Court acknowledged the role of social science in inform-
ing the debate over the need to protect children as witnesses, but ignored
the debates raging within the social science community. Interestingly,
the Court specifically relied upon the American Psychological Associa-
tion's (APA's) amicus brief, purportedly submitted in support of neither
party and co-authored by Gail Goodman. 148 Not surprisingly, that brief
did not represent a consensus of the social science community, as evi-
denced by the submission of another amicus brief by the Institute for
Psychological Therapies.1 49 This latter brief charged that the APA brief
presented "a pattern of selective citation and selective reporting that re-
quires caution and wariness."' 50 The brief also argued that because the
linchpin of the APA brief was an unpublished study-also written by
Gail Goodman-the greater social science community had had little op-
portunity to evaluate its conclusions.1 51
A third reason why it may be inappropriate to rely on particular
social science evidence in shaping confrontation springs from the diffi-
culty of separating any bias from the science. Science-with its connota-
LECTIONS, supra note 113, at 92, 103; Goodman & Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault, supra note
56, at 208.
145. Ceci et al., Suggestibility, supra note 132 (manuscript at 24).
146. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3169 (1990) (emphasis in original).
147. Id. at 3175 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. See id. at 3168-69.
149. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for Psychological Therapies in Support of San-
dra Ann Craig, Respondent, Craig (No. 89-478).
150. Id. at 20.
151. Id. at 8.
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tions of objectivity and accuracy-is the perfect mask for an agenda.152
Indeed, in a scathing indictment of the social science community, Ceci
observed that modem research on child witnesses suffers from
a lack of effort on the part of investigators to disconfirm their own
hypotheses-in part because of their strong advocacy positions. Sci-
ence is best conceptualized as "proof by disproof," meaning that scien-
tists have a responsibility to attempt to disprove alternative
hypotheses, rather than to exclusively amass data consistent with their
own pet theories. The latter tendency has, unfortunately been the mo-
dus operandi in this politically charged arena in which scientific find-
ings have a way of turning up in newspapers and congressional
hearings with great rapidity. 153
Of course, the social science community is not alone in yielding to the
emotionality of the issues. Lawyers, judges, and legislators are similarly
affected, 154 and all thus contribute to a recipe for hasty and deceptively
attractive remedies.
To illustrate, advocacy is evident in Gail Goodman's work.155 She
writes that "[t]he fields of psychology and law share, in principle, at least
one common goal-to find the truth about social events." 156 Given that
goal, she proposes shielding child witnesses from the adversary sys-
tem. 157 Her justification for shielding the child is that "children may be
more easily confused than adults and may consequently suffer a loss
152. See Karst, supra note 107, at 105 ("When experts help the courts make policy, they
are not likely to shed their attitudes on the ultimate policy issues."). One observer has at-
tempted to minimize the role of bias in scientific inquiries, arguing that
[s]cience is concerned with the advancement of knowledge generally, regardless of
whether any group, other than science itself, benefits from it. Although individual
scientists may be motivated by personal interests in fame, fortune, funding, or poli-
tics, these interests are largely filtered out by institutionalized procedures that rea-
sonably assure objectivity and unbiased interpretation of data.
Tanford, supra note 143, at 158-59 (footnote omitted).
153. Ceci et al., Suggestibility, supra note 132 (manuscript at 5) (citation omitted).
154. See, eg., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3172 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Constitution is meant to protect against, rather than conform to, current 'widespread
belief' .... "); Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ("This area of the
law is dominated by emotion, which is understandable in light of the interests society wants to
protect-abused children. But... of greater concern should be the adherence to our constitu-
tional rights. We cannot ever permit emotion-charged issues to erode our fundamental
liberties.").
155. The charge of advocacy could be hurled at any number of social scientists on all sides
of the child witness debate. Goodman is used as an example here, not because her work stands
alone in its inclination towards advocacy or her advocacy is particularly egregious, but because
the influence of her work in the public policy arena is probably unrivaled. See, eg., supra text
accompanying notes 56, 148.
156. Gail S. Goodman, The Child Witness: Conclusions and Future Directions for Re-
search and Legal Practice, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs No. 2, at 157, 173 (1984).
157. Goodman & Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault, supra note 56, at 204-05.
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of confidence ...plac[ing] them at a disadvantage within the adver-
sary system. Jurors tend to believe witnesses who are confident and
do not appear confused."158 The truth justification, however, seems
insincere when we consider Goodman's further observation that "the
child's perceived confidence correlated significantly with the child's
perceived credibility ... and with the jurors' impressions of the defend-
ant's guilt .... In reality, however, the children's perceived confidence
and their accuracy in answering the attorneys' questions were not relia-
bly related .... ,,159 Thus, Goodman advocates shielding child witnesses
so that they may project more confidence in their testimony, yet she ac-
knowledges that this confidence is misleading to jurors. How this fur-
thers truth is not clear. How it furthers the conviction rate is. 160
Finally and most importantly, it is inappropriate to rely on particu-
lar social science evidence when any reliance is premature because criti-
cal questions remain unanswered. For instance, the issue of whether
children will falsely report abuse has received much debate. If they do
not falsely report, then arguably the Confrontation Clause can be com-
promised to allow shielded testimony. Nevertheless, one cannot reason-
ably contend that children never make false reports of abuse. The better
question is: Wen do children falsely report abuse? We also need to
know if and when physical confrontation deters the lying or otherwise
misreporting child, and if and when shielding facilitates false reporting
by providing the child with a relatively informal and relaxed atmosphere
in which to relate any untruth.1 61 The APA brief in Craig conceded that
critical research on these issues remains incomplete. 162
The constitutional guarantee of a face-to-face meeting is entitled to a
presumption of validity that should be disproved before we dispense with
158. Id. at 204.
159. Gail S. Goodman et al., Determinants of the Child VictimIs Perceived Credibility, in
PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY 1, 11 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds., 1989). In this
study, child witnesses testified in a moot courtroom, and no shielding procedures were used.
Id. at 7-8.
160. Ironically, the preliminary findings of Goodman's current research indicate that
mock jurors assign more credibility to children testifying live in the courtroom than to chil-
dren testifying by closed circuit television. Dr. Gail S. Goodman, Lecture at the NASO Ad-
vanced Study Institute, The Child Witness in Context: Cognitive, Social, and Legal
Perspectives (May 22, 1992).
161. See Ruddock, supra note 71, at 406 ("Neglected [by researchers] is any testing of the
effect the traditional courtroom setting has on the testimony of a subject coached to lie, com-
pared to testimony in less stressful atmospheres.").
162. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Neither
Party at 23, Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (No. 89-478). Experimentation in this
area may require the interrogation of child witnesses with a motive to lie (as in Ceci's research)
both in and out of a confrontational setting.
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it. If physical confrontation prevents false positives (allegations) as well
as false negatives (recantations and stymied deliveries), it may be neces-
sary to rethink the appropriateness of shielding child witnesses. Until it
is proved that physical confrontation has no value in promoting its truth-
seeking goal when children are witnesses, caution is warranted in shield-
ing child witnesses-at least when the circumstances surrounding the al-
legations of abuse are known to foster inaccurate reporting. These issues
are important because the Craig Court's emphasis on assuring the truth-
seeking goal of confrontation surely should benefit the defense at least as
much as the prosecution.
There is undoubtedly a place for social science in shaping constitu-
tional law. But while "scientific truth. . . must come about by contro-
versy,"163 the Constitution may require something more. If anything,
the limitations on ecological validity, the divergence of scientific opinion,
the emotionality of the issues, and the unresolved but critical questions in
child witness research all indicate that Craig was at best premature and
make clear the need for courts and legislatures to proceed with
restraint. 164
MI. The Compromise of Physical Confrontation
It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before
the accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a
chance to defend himself against the charges.
Acts 25:16
Only to the extent that we can appreciate the benefits of physical
confrontation and the possible consequences of its compromise can we
establish informed and meaningful procedural standards for shielding
child witnesses. Prior to Coy and Craig, the Court's Confrontation
Clause analysis focused on the admission of hearsay statements 165 and
163. Ceci, Overarching Issues, supra note 117, at 8 (quoting EDWIN G. BORING, The Psy-
chology of Controversy, in HISTORY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS 67, 68
(Robert I. Watson & Donald T. Campbell eds., 1963)) (omission in original).
164. Cf John F. Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg and the Psychology of Testimony, 3 ILL.
L. REv. 399 (1909) (an amusing criticism of applying social science developments to the law).
165. See, eg., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). In Mattoy,
[u]pon the trial it was shown by the government that two of its witnesses on the
former trial.., had since died, whereupon a transcribed copy of the reporter's steno-
graphic notes of their testimony upon such trial, supported by his testimony that it
was correct, was admitted to be read in evidence, and constituted the strongest proof
against the accused.
1d. at 240. The Court reasoned that "[t]he substance of the constitutional protection is pre-
served to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and
of subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination." Id. at 244.
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other restrictions on cross-examination, 166 and not specifically on the ele-
ment of a face-to-face meeting. Still, the cases are replete with remarks
to the effect that the Clause embodies the feature of physical confronta-
tion. 167 To be sure, the hearsay cases implicate physical confrontation
because the hearsay declarant typically does not testify at trial.168 Never-
theless, it seems that because the person who transmits the hearsay state-
ment does stand face-to-face with the defendant, the value of physical
confrontation (as opposed to cross-examination) did not crystallize until
special testimonial procedures were implemented specifically to shield
child witnesses from defendants.
Once the precise issue of physical confrontation came into focus in
Coy, 169 the Court did not hesitate to acknowledge its significance. The
Court observed:
It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person "to his face" than
"behind his back." In the former context, even if the lie is told, it will
often be told less convincingly.... [lace-to-face presence may, unfor-
tunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the
same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the
child coached by a malevolent adult.170
166. See, eg., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1973). In Davis, the Court stated that
the right of confrontation is paramount to the State's policy of protecting a juvenile
offender. Whatever temporary embarrassment might result to Green or his family by
disclosure of his juvenile record-if the prosecution insisted on using him to make its
case-is outweighed by petitioner's right to probe into the influence of possible bias
in the testimony of a crucial identification witness.
Id. at 319.
167. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) ("The Confrontation Clause
provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those
who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination."); California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) ("[I]t is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial
that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause .... "); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1933) ("[Ihe privilege to confront one's accusers and cross-
examine them face to face is assured to a defendant by the Sixth Amendment .... ").
168. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1024 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In his dissent in
Craig, however, Justice Scalia asserted:
Much of the Court's opinion consists of applying to this case the mode of analysis we
have used in the admission of hearsay evidence. The Sixth Amendment does not
literally contain a prohibition upon such evidence, since it guarantees the defendant
only the right to confront "the witnesses against him."..... The phrase obviously
refers to those who give testimony against the defendant at trial.
Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3173-74 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Although physical confrontation was distinctly at issue in the earlier case of Ken-
tucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987), the Court sidestepped the issue there because physical
confrontation was denied only for purposes of the children's competency hearing and was
otherwise enjoyed during the trial. Id. at 740-44.
170. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019-20.
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In Craig, the Court reiterated that observation, 17 1 but concluded that
face-to-face confrontation was not an absolute right. 172 The implications
of compromising that right are discussed below in light of the Court's
two-fold purpose: protecting children and furthering truth.
A. Carving Out A Narrow Exception
In Craig, the Court indicated that physical confrontation may be
compromised only "in certain narrow circumstances." 173 The Court
carved out a narrow exception for protecting children, at least when it
would serve the pursuit of truth. 174 Nonetheless, a "slippery slope"
problem is alive and well in this area. Children are different from adults,
and those differences may necessitate the use of special procedures in
certain cases. 175 But adults differ from each other as well, and those dif-
ferences may also compel the use of special procedures in certain cases.
Indeed, the distinction between adult and child becomes blurred by stat-
utes that protect teenagers.176
As one scholar has observed:
If "confrontation" is redefined in child abuse cases, then it may be
redefined in other categories of cases as well, depending on a judge's or
legislature's inclination to weigh the victim's trauma in those cases
more heavily than the trauma of victims in other cases. One-way mir-
rors may. appear not only in child abuse cases, but also in adult rape
cases, attempted murder cases, kidnapping cases, and any other cases
in which the victim has suffered physical and psychological trauma
that may be aggravated by facing the defendant. The government
171. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3164.
172. Id. at 3163-66.
173. Id. at 3165.
174. Id. at 3167-70.
175. Apparently anticipating the argument that a change in confrontation law could open
the floodgates, the American Psychological Association's brief in Craig made a point of distin-
guishing the type of harm a child may suffer as a result of testimonial stress from the type of
harm an adult might suffer under the same circumstances. The APA wrote: "Stressors in
childhood can slow the course of normal cognitive and emotional development such that
stressed children do not advance at the same pace as their unstressed peers. Temporary devel-
opment regressions may even appear. Although adults too may suffer distress from legal in-
volvement, their development is more complete." Brief for Amicus Curiae American
Psychological Association in Support of Neither Party at 7-8, Craig (No. 89-478).
176. See, eg., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509 (West Supp. 1991) (under 18); ALA. CODE § 15-25-2
(Supp. 1991) (under 16); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (Michie 1987) (under 17); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1992) (under 16); HAW. REv. STAT. § 626 (1985) (HAW. R. EvID.
616) (under 16); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024A (Supp. 1991) (under 16); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-
405 (Supp. 1991) (under 16); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1991) (16 or under);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1990) (16 or under); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17
(Michie 1984) (under 16); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1991) (17 and under); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1988) (under 16).
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could offer other equally compelling reasons for "excusing" confronta-
tion, such as fear for the safety of witnesses who testify against defend-
ants in drug cases, or in trials of terrorists or members of other violent
organizations. 
17 7
In fact, during oral argument in Coy, the State conceded that the princi-
ple exempting child witnesses from physical confrontation also applied to
other categories of witnesses. 178 This is so because the state arguably has
a compelling interest in protecting all crime victims, not just children,
from trauma induced by testifying. 179 Indeed, the Federal Victims'
Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 cryptically provides that "[v]ictims of
crime should be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the
criminal justice process." 1 0
Providing protection for all crime victims-and not just children-
from the trauma of testifying further compromises the confrontation
right and creates mounting costs for the criminal justice system. Even if
only those crime victims that received psychological or psychiatric coun-
seling following the crime sought alternative testimonial procedures,181
177. Massaro, supra note 59, at 916; see also Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534,
546-47, 524 N.E.2d 366, 374-75 (1988) ("For constitutional purposes, no principled distinc-
tion can be drawn between a child witness and any other class whom the Legislature might in
the future deem in need of special treatment.").
178. Transcript of Proceedings at 44-45, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (No. 86-6757).
During oral argument in Craig, Maryland's Attorney General made an identical concession.
Official Transcript, Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at 20-21, 23,
Craig (No. 89-478).
179. But see Glenn F. Lang, To See or Not To See the Defendant: Expanding the Use of
Florida's Special Procedures for Taking the Testimony of Witnesses, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
321 (1991) (arguing that there is no empirical support for such an extension).
180. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 506(2), 104 Stat. 4789, 4822 (codified with some differences in
language at 42 U.S.C.A. § 10606(b)(2) (West Supp. 1992)).
181. For example, in Sheehan v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 757, 223 N.W.2d 600 (1974), Woods
was an adult robbery victim. A psychiatrist diagnosed him as suffering from chronic neurosis.
The psychiatrist opined that testifying in open court before the public and a jury would cause
Woods to become psychiatrically ill, id. at 760, 223 N.W.2d at 602, in the main due to Woods'
fear of being questioned about homosexual relations, id. at 765, 223 N.W.2d at 605. Neverthe-
less, because the psychiatrist had little contact with Woods between the deposition and the day
of trial and was unaware of Woods' testimony at a preliminary hearing and an earlier deposi-
tion, the appellate court concluded that the psychiatrist's opinion did not provide a sufficient
foundation for the use of Woods' deposition in lieu of live testimony at trial. Id. at 765-66, 223
N.W.2d at 605.
Similarly, in United States v. Benfield, Patricia Cady was an adult ddnap victim. 593
F.2d 815, 816 (8th Cir. 1979). Following her liberation from captivity, Cady "participated in a
news conference and granted interviews with journalists and the broadcast media." Ide at 817.
Several months later, Cady developed psychiatric problems that gradually worsened until she
could no longer tolerate crowds or work. Id. at 817 n.3. Her psychiatrist, indicating that these
infirmities were directly related to her abduction, concluded that Cady should not be required
to endure a trial situation or to face the defendant, who was charged with misprision of a
felony and being an accessory after the fact. The trial court granted the Government's request
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the expense to the system could be significant. These special testimonial
procedures cost money and require the expenditure of human and other
resources on hearings to determine the appropriateness of the alternative
procedures.
In any event, Craig was concerned with something more than pro-
tecting witnesses from testimonial trauma. Craig recognized the state's
interest in protecting children, and the law is replete with examples
where we distinguish between children as children and adults in ways
that we do not distinguish among adults. For example, we prohibit the
sale of cigarettes and pornography to children but not to adults, 182 even
though age may not be a reliable predictor of maturity. Thus, there may
be a ready-made case for drawing the line at children-who are after all a
special class in the eyes of the law. There is every indication, however,
that the line will be tested.18 3
to depose Ms. Cady and ordered that the defendant be outside the vision of Ms. Cady. Ia. at
817. The subsequent conviction was reversed on appeal. Id at 822.
182. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 308(a), 313.1(a) (West 1988) (regulating, respec-
tively, cigarettes and pornography).
183. Indeed, various legislatures have already begun to extend the use of alternative testi-
monial procedures to other groups. In California, for instance, people under 16 years of age
and people developmentally disabled as a result of mental retardation can have their prelimi-
nary hearing testimony recorded and preserved on video tape. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346(a)
(West Supp. 1992). Similarly, in Indiana, children under 14 years of age and mentally disabled
individuals may be entitled to have their testimony videotaped for use at trial or transmitted to
the courtroom by closed circuit television. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6(b) (Burns Supp.
1991). And in Michigan, the same special testimonial procedures are available to children
under 15 years of age and to any person 15 years of age or older with a developmental disabil-
ity. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2163a(1)(b) (West Supp. 1991). The statute with the
most expansive scope, however, is that of South Carolina, which provides: "VICTIMS AND
WITNESSES WHO ARE VERY YOUNG, ELDERLY, WHO ARE HANDICAPPED OR
WHO HAVE SPECIAL NEEDS, HAVE A RIGHT TO SPECIAL RECOGNITION AND
ATTENTION BY ALL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, MEDICAL, AND SOCIAL SERVICE
AGENCIES. The court shall treat 'special' witnesses sensitively, using closed or taped ses-
sions when appropriate." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989)
(capitalization in original).
At least one court, however, has declined to extend the use of alternative testimonial
procedures without precise statutory authority for the extension. In State v. Iowa District
Court, 464 N.W.2d 244 (Iowa 1990), the court stated that:
Our statutory authority for sequestering witnesses is keyed to our statutory defi-
nition of "child." That definition sets the age parameters at "any person under the
age of fourteen years." Two of the victim witnesses did not meet the statutory crite-
rion, since they were fourteen and fifteen years old.... The State argues that the
statute was designed to protect a child's mentality from the rigors of a courtroom
experience. Because these children suffered from a mental disability, the State argues
their chronological age is irrelevant, their functioning level was below normal, they
functioned as children and are therefore covered by the spirit and intent of [the
statute].
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B. Retaining Reliability and Adversarial Testing
Even if Craig's exception to the Confrontation Clause remains con-
fined to testimony by children, it has consequences for criminal child
abuse proceedings. In Craig, the Court satisfied itself that the reliability
of testimony by one-way closed circuit television is practically identical
to that of in-court testimony, observing that "the presence of these other
elements of confrontation-oath, cross-examination, and observation of
the witness' demeanor-adequately ensures that the testimony [by one-
way closed circuit television] is both reliable and subject to rigorous ad-
versarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that accorded
live, in-person testimony."18 4 The Court makes this bold assertion in
part because testimony by one-way closed circuit television retains assur-
ances of reliability and adversariness that are in many ways superior to
those required for the admission of hearsay under the Clause.185 Indeed,
when a hearsay declarant does not testify at trial but the declarant's
statement is received into evidence, the oath, cross-examination, and the
opportunity to observe the declarant's demeanor are absent. All three of
these checks for truthfulness are present-albeit in modified form-with
testimony by one-way closed circuit television.18 6 Nevertheless, the dif-
Id. at 247. The appellate court therefore held that the trial court's sequestering of the defend-
ant during the testimony of the witnesses was error as there was no statutory basis for it. Id.
184. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3166 (1990).
185. See id. at 3167. The Court has nevertheless recognized that the Clause excludes some
evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Idaho v.
Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146 (1990). For hearsay to be admissible under the Clause, the
declarant's statement must bear adequate indicia of reliability, either by falling into a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 743 (1992), or by exhibiting partic-
ularized guarantees of trustworthiness, Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3146-48. But at least vAth firmly
rooted hearsay exceptions, no showing of the declarant's unavailability need be made. White,
112 S. Ct. at 743.
186. So is it anomalous that an out-of-court statement that falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception is admissible without a showing of unavailability, White, 112 S. Ct. at 743,
while the use of one-way closed circuit television requires a case-specific showing of necessity
after Coy and Craig? Maybe not. The Court has made clear that the standards for the admis-
sion of out-of-court statements under the Clause are separate and distinct from the standards
that govern in-court procedures once a witness is testifying. Id. at 743-44. Although it may be
that firmly rooted hearsay exceptions enjoy "the weight accorded longstanding judicial and
legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court state-
ments," Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3147, shielded testimony is simply not well understood. To the
extent that a lying or otherwise misreporting child is thereby equipped to testify confidently, it
may be misleading to jurors. See supra text accompanying notes 156-159. In contrast, even a
layperson understands that hearsay is inferior, secondhand information. See Peter Miene et
al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683,
691-92 (1992) (a social science study demonstrating that jurors weigh eyewitness testimony
more heavily than hearsay testimony in their verdict decisions).
Several considerations may deter the prosecutor in child abuse trials from trying a defend-
HASTINGS LAWV JOURNAL [Vol. 43
SHIELDING CHILD WITNESSES
ferences between live, in-court testimony and testimony delivered over a
video monitor cannot be ignored, and those differences raise questions
about how well truth-seeking is served when child witnesses are shielded.
(1) The Right to Present a Defense
Denying a criminal defendant physical confrontation by shielding
the child witness may implicate the right to present a defense, 187 compro-
mising the reliability and adversarial nature of the proceedings. 188 In
ant on the basis of hearsay. First, the out-of-court statement must be complete enough to
make out a prima facie case, and a child's out-of-court statement that "He touched my pri-
vates" may not be enough to demonstrate the element of penetration, for example. Second,
even if the out-of-court statement is complete, the prosecution still has to prove the charges
beyond a reasonable doubt. Placing the child on the stand may make for a much more com-
pelling case. See BILLIE WRIGHT DZIECH & CHARLES B. SCHUDSON, ON TRIAL: AMERICA'S
COURTS AND THEIR TREATMENT OF SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN 148 (1989).
187. The right to present a defense flows from both the right of confrontation and the right
to compulsory process. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 613 (1978).
The Court has previously considered the constitutionality of curtailing a defendant's right
to present a defense. For example, in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), the state court
had excluded defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony as unreliable per se. The Supreme
Court held that "restrictions of a defendant's right to testify may not be arbitrary or dispropor-
tionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. In applying its evidentiary rules a State
must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed .... " Id. at
55-56. Similarly, in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), a state statute prevented persons
charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories in the same crime from being introduced as
witnesses for one another. The Supreme Court held:
[T]he petitioner in this case was denied his right to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to
put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to
events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been rele-
vant and material to the defense.
Id. at 23. See generally EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE: THE Ac-
CUSED'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INTRODUCE FAVORABLE EVIDENCE (1990) (exploring
the constitutional right of criminal defendants to introduce favorable testimony).
188. It has been suggested that physical confrontation is dispensable if its only value to the
defendant is intimidation of the child witness such that the child is rendered uncommunicative.
See Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 230-31 (Ky. 1986); Catherine M. Mahady-
Smith, Comment, The Young Victim as Witness for the Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse?,
99 DICK. L. REV. 721, 743 (1985) ("The accused hopes to capitalize on the inherent weak-
nesses of childhood and he relies on his presence and the system to intimidate the child witness
into silence or anxiety-produced confusion."). But the defense is not necessarily interested in
intimidating the child witness. For tactical reasons, the defense might actually stipulate to
testimony by one-way closed circuit television if it has reason to believe that the witness is
likely to break down and cry uncontrollably. What could be a stronger indictment against the
defendant than the presentation of a child who is obviously terrified in the defendant's pres-
ence? In any event, that a child witness may be intimidated is not necessarily inappropriate;
intimidation may induce truthfulness. Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 518 n.8, 530 A.2d
275, 283 n.8 (1987).
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United States v. Inadi, 18 9 a case involving the admissibility of a co-con-
spirator's hearsay statement, the Supreme Court pronounced it signifi-
cant that the defense was not harmed in any way by the admission of the
out-of-court statement in the prosecution's case-in-chief, because the de-
fense could still call the declarant as a witness in its own case. 190 This
scenario stands in sharp contrast to cases allowing testimony by one-way
closed circuit television, because in those cases the child is effectively pro-
nounced off-limits for purposes of physical confrontation (but not cross-
examination). Once the prosecutor demonstrates that a child witness
should be protected from physical confrontation during the prosecution's
case, it is seemingly axiomatic that the child should also be shielded from
physical confrontation during the defendant's case. Thus, the defendant
is precluded from developing a defense based on a face-to-face meeting.
As much as the dissent in Coy attempted to trivialize the importance
of physical confrontation, it conceded that denying confrontation could
amount to a constitutionally questionable restriction of cross-examina-
tion when a defendant seeks to demonstrate that the victim cannot iden-
tify him or her.191 Though eyewitness identification was not an issue in
Coy, 192 consider a case where the child witness had observed the assail-
ant, and the child's testimony is transmitted by one-way closed circuit
television because the child might otherwise suffer some psychological
harm or have difficulty testifying. The prosecutor connects the defendant
to the crime by introducing incriminating physical evidence or by using
another witness's testimony. Suppose further that had the child testified
in the defendant's physical presence, the child's identification of the de-
fendant would have been equivocal. This could be enough to raise a rea-
sonable doubt, but the use of one-way closed circuit television would
deny the jury the opportunity to consider the child's equivocation.
In cases where eyewitness identification is not an issue because the
child is familiar with the alleged assailant, the defense may be denied the
opportunity to explore the full range of credibility issues inasmuch as it
cannot base any argument upon how the child responded to the defend-
ant's presence. Assuming that the child responds favorably to the de-
fendant, the defense may argue persuasively that actions speak louder
189. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
190. Id. at 396-98.
191. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1026-27 n.1 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
192. In Coy, the crime occurred at night, the assailant blinded the eyes of his victims with
a flashlight, and the assailant wore a stocking over his head. Id. The prosecutor linked the
defendant to the crime by introducing incriminating physical evidence confiscated from the




than words, and that the child has been "brainwashed"-perhaps by a
vindictive parent or a suggestive interviewer. The importance of this sort
of demeanor evidence should not be underestimated. One example is the
trial of Robert and Lois Bentz in Jordan, Minnesota, where there were
widespread allegations of child sexual abuse. When their five-year-old
son, Billy, who had been in foster care and therapy for months, was led
into the courtroom by the prosecutor, "[h]e spied his parents, waved,
smiled, and in a cheery voice called out, 'Hi Mom, Hi Dad!' "193 The
jury in its role as judge of witness demeanor should have the opportunity
to assess this sort of evidence. 194
State v. Sorenson1 95 further illustrates the point. In Sorenson, the
child complainant accused her uncle and her father of sexual assault. 196
At the uncle's preliminary hearing, the child's testimony was videotaped,
and the uncle agreed to be excluded from the courtroom during the
child's testimony after the child identified him. 197 At the uncle's trial,
the court admitted the videotaped preliminary hearing testimony in lieu
of the child's live testimony.198 At trial, defendant's
counsel (who did not represent the defendant at the preliminary) ar-
gued to the jury that when L.S. first brought the sexual intercourse to
the attention of the authorities, she falsely named her uncle as the per-
petrator in order to protect her father, and when she later named her
father, she was afraid or unwilling to change her statement about her
uncle. Counsel could not cross-examine L.S. on the basis of that the-
ory and the jury had only reports of witnesses that she feared defend-
ant to test the theory. Yet her videotape disclosed no fear of
defendant, and because L.S. was not present at the trial, it was impossi-
ble for the jury to observe her demeanor in his presence. 199
In other words, the uncle could not show that the child's demeanor was
consistent with his theory of what occurred.
The opposite sort of demeanor evidence may also be persuasively
argued by the defense. For instance, assume that a child who allegedly is
the victim of abuse takes the stand. While on the stand, the child fidgets
193. Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for Psychological Therapies in Support of Sandra
Ann Craig, Respondent at 24, Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (No. 89-478).
194. Whether or not Billy's reaction to seeing his parents was probative of any material
issue is debatable. It would not be incredible for even injured children to have conflicting
feelings toward a parent who may have harmed them. But Billy's reaction to seeing his par-
ents could tip the balance for the jury that assesses the probative value of this demeanor evi-
dence in the context of all the evidence received during the trial.
195. 152 Wis. 2d 471, 449 N.W.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1989).
196. Id. at 478, 449 N.W.2d at 282.
197. Id. at 478, 449 N.W.2d at 283.
198. Id. at 479, 449 N.W.2d at 283.
199. Id. at 496, 449 N.W.2d at 290.
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in his seat, looking everywhere but at the examiner. During testimony
his speech is halting, and he soon becomes unresponsive. Observing this
display in the context of an entire trial, especially where exculpatory evi-
dence has been introduced, a juror might conclude that the moral weight
of the proceedings had come to bear on the child's conscience and inhib-
ited the child from testifying falsely or otherwise inaccurately. Yet the
jury may never observe the child's display of preoccupation when the
child is sheltered in a special testimonial room, away from the solemnity
and officiality of the courtroom. Again, the jury in its role as judge of
witness demeanor should have the opportunity to assess this sort of
evidence.20o
The effect of precluding the development of a defense based on a
face-to-face meeting by shielding the child witness is exacerbated by stat-
utes that prohibit counsel from even commenting on the lack of physical
confrontation.201 Craig itself arguably supports a jury instruction that
sets forth the value in face-to-face meetings and the value in shielding
child witnesses.202 With or without such a jury instruction,20 3 defense
counsel might argue that the jury should discount the child's testimony
because it has not been tested by the solemnity and officiality of the
200. See Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 233 (Ky. 1986) (Leibson, J., concur-
ring) ("If the child will not answer questions when called by the defendant, the jury is entitled
to know this and evaluate this aspect of the case."); id. at 235 (Stephens, J., dissenting) ("The
majority has denied the right of the accused and the jury to see the reaction of the accuser to
the physical presence of the accused.").
201. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(e)(3) (West Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 19-
3024A.4(c) (Supp. 1991).
202. See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3167-70 (1990). Such a jury instruction
might read:
Face-to-face confrontation enhances the accuracy of fact-finding by reducing the risk
that a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent person. Such confrontation,
however, may so overwhelm a child witness that truth-seeking is actually disserved,
because the child may be too overwhelmed to communicate in the courtroom. A
child witness in this case has testified by one-way closed circuit television. You are
the sole judges of the believability of a witness and the weight to be given the testi-
mony of each witness.
203. Courts have at least been willing to instruct the jury that they should draw no nega-
tive inference about the defendant from the use of a shielding device. See, e.g., Joint Appendix
at 17, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1987) (No. 86-6757) (The court instructed the jury: "I
would caution you ... that you are to draw no inference of any kind from the presence of that
screen. You know, in the plainest of language, that is not evidence of the defendant's guilt
... .") (citation omitted); Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530, 530 A.2d 275, 292 (1987)
("The jury was instructed not to give the televised testimony any greater or lesser weight than
if it had been given in the courtroom."); State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 456 (R.I. 1989) ("At
the time the videotape was played for the jury, the trial judge instructed the jury that they were
not to draw an inference of guilt or that the victim needed physical protection from the
defendant.").
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courtroom and the moral weight of testifying in the defendant's presence.
This type of argument would be especially persuasive where the prosecu-
tion's case is based on the child's uncorroborated allegations.
The prosecutorial advantage is particularly troubling because in
many jurisdictions the relevant statutes allow the prosecution, and not
the defense, to invoke the special testimonial procedures.2°4 These stat-
utes assume that the prosecutor will act in the child's best interest. A
prosecutor, however, may be motivated to invoke these statutes for stra-
tegic reasons, not just to protect the child. The prosecutor may not want
the jury to see the child's reaction to the defendant's physical presence
for fear of undermining his or her presentation.20 5 Of course, if the de-
204. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-2(a) (Supp. 1991) (on prosecutor's motion); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-4253.A (1989) (on prosecutor's motion); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203(b)
(Michie 1987) (on prosecutor's motion); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b) (West Supp. 1992) (on
prosecutor's motion or on court's own motion); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-401.3(1)
(West 1990) (on prosecutor's motion); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 351 l(a) (1987) (on prosecu-
tor's motion); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8(c) (Burns Supp. 1991) (on prosecutor's motion);
NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 174.227.1 (Michie 1986) (on prosecutor's motion or on court's own
motion); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17.A (Michie 1984) (on prosecutor's motion); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2907.41(A)(1) (Anderson 1987) (on prosecutor's motion); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5985(a) (Purdon Supp. 1991) ("The child victim or material witness, through his par-
ent or guardian, or, where applicable, the child's advocate or the attorney for the Common-
wealth may move .... "); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 15.5(2) (on prosecutor's motion); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.44.150(1) (West Supp. 1991) (on prosecutor's motion).
205. Compare Justice Scalia's dissent in Craig:
The State's interest here is in fact no more and no less than what the State's interest
always is when it seeks to get a class of evidence admitted in criminal proceedings:
more convictions of guilty defendants. That is not an unworthy interest, but it
should not be dressed up as a humanitarian one. And the interest on the other side is
also what it usually is when the State seeks to get a new class of evidence admitted:
fewer convictions of innocent defendants.
Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3175 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, some jurisdictions have provided an attorney, separate from the prosecutor,
to represent the interests of child witnesses in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3509(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1991); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046(a)(1) (1990); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 92.53(2)(a) (West Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405(2) (Supp. 1991); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5983 (Purdon Supp. 1991). See also Jacqueline Y. Parker, The Rights of
Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEw ENG. L. REv. 643, 665-66
(1982) (advocating court appointment of specially trained attorneys to represent child wit-
nesses). But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1348.5 (West Supp. 1992) (providing for court appoint-
ment of a children's representative, but also providing that the court shall not appoint
attorneys). The necessity for such attorneys may be obviated by the fact that Craig was not
simply concerned with protecting child witnesses; Craig was concerned with the protection of
child witnesses to the extent that the child's ability to communicate would otherwise be im-
paired. Prosecutors, rather than specially appointed children's attorneys, are probably in the
best position to determine whether a child can effectively communicate at trial, since the prose-
cution's case stands to suffer otherwise. If the protection of children were the paramount
interest, then pragmatism would indicate that specially appointed children's attorneys are nec-
essary, because prosecutors might very well have a conflict in simultaneously representing both
July 1992] SHIELDING CHILD WITNESSES
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
fense also could invoke the special testimonial procedures, it might do so
where a highly emotional child could be prejudicial to the presentation of
its case.
(2) Problems Endemic to the Video Medium
Testimony transmitted simultaneously by closed circuit television
and testimony recorded on videotape have spawned their own set of
problems that call into question the reliability and adversariness of these
testimonial procedures. A prominent concern related to reliability is the
unavoidable editorialization of what the jury observes. As one court has
recognized, "there are serious questions about the effects on the jury of
using closed-circuit television to present the testimony of an absent wit-
ness since the camera becomes the juror's eyes, selecting and comment-
ing upon what is seen." 206
The case of Strickland v. State20 7 illustrates a particularly blatant
exploitation of the opportunity to editorialize. In that case, "[t]he person
operating the camera was an investigator in the district attorney's office
and, thus, obviously not completely disinterested in the proceedings. ' 208
The operator "panned" the camera from the witness to the attorneys and
the defendant at least once, "and when the child was asked the critical
question of what the defendant had done to her, the camera focused or
zoomed-in on her face."'20 9
Maintaining a stationary lens and utilizing only disinterested cam-
era operators only begins to address the editorialization problem. A
more subtle, and perhaps unintentional, aspect of the problem remains
because "the lens or camera angle chosen can make a witness look small
and weak or large and strong. '210 As the Supreme Court long ago ob-
served in Snyder v. Massachusetts, "[i]t is common knowledge that a
camera can be so placed, and lights and shadows so adjusted, as to give a
distorted picture of reality." 211
the child's interest in being free from psychic harm and the state's interest in obtaining a
conviction. It would therefore seem that states need to prioritize their goals by deciding which
they most want: communicative children that can assist the prosecution or children free from
psychic harm. The goal will determine the appropriate advocate.
206. Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 786, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278
(Ct. App. 1985).
207. 550 So. 2d 1042 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), affd sub nom. Exparte Stricldand, 550 So.
2d 1054 (Ala. 1989).
208. Id. at 1050.
209. Id. at 1051.
210. James L. Armstrong, Comment, The Criminal Videotape Trial: Serious Constitu-
tional Questions, 55 OR. L. REv. 567, 575 (1976).
211. 291 U.S. 97, 115 (1934).
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Another troubling aspect of these testimonial procedures concerns
the information that is kept from the jury. Although many statutes re-
quire that every voice on the video transmission or tape be identified,212
statutes typically do not prescribe with any particularity what shall be
depicted on the television screen. Only a handful of jurisdictions specifi-
cally provide by statute that the images of all persons in the testimonial
room shall be on camera.213 Thus, most camera operators are not obli-
gated to capture both body language and facial expressions of the child
witnesses, let alone the body language and facial expressions of question-
ing attorneys or others who are present.214 Of course, a jury could ob-
serve all of these factors were the witness to testify in open court. No
doubt these factors can contribute to a jury's assessment of a witness's
credibility in certain situations, such as where a witness is led by the
questioning attorney's facial expression.
Case law is replete with examples where only the child was depicted
on the screen. 215 State v. Edward Charles L. 21 6 is a particularly egregious
212. See, eg., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509(b)(2)(B)(v) (West Supp. 1991); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-4253.B.3 (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(e)(5) (West Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 3511(a)(3) (1987); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024A.4(e) (Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-1658(a)(2)(C) (1986 & Supp. 1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4)(c) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(b)(7)(c) (West Supp.
1991); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(A)(2)(c) (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 753.C.3 (West Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 24-7-116(d)(3) (Supp. 1991); UTAH R. CiuM. P. 15.5(1)(d); VT. R. EvID. 807(d)(3).
213. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509(b)(2)(B)(v) (West Supp. 1991) ("the image and voices of
all persons who in any way participate in the examination"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(e)(5)
(West Supp. 1992) (same); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024A.4(e) (Supp. 1991) (same); N.Y. CRiM.
PRoc. LAW § 65.30.1 (McKinney Supp. 1992) ("the image of all other persons other than the
operator present in the testimonial room"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.150(1)(j) (West
Supp. 1991) ("All parties in the room with the child are on camera and can be viewed by all
other parties. If viewing all participants is not possible, the court shall describe for the viewers
the location of the prosecutor, defense attorney, and other participants in relation to the
child."). See also State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 442-43, 484 A.2d 1330, 1349 (Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1984) ("iT]he witness and counsel shall be so arranged that all three persons in
the testimonial room can be seen on the courtroom monitors simultaneously.").
214. For instance, the majority of jurisdictions allows the child witness to be accompanied
into the testimonial room by a support person. See, eg., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:283.A
(West Supp. 1992) ("any person, other than a relative of the child, whose presence is deter-
mined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child"); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.071, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991) ("any person whose presence
would contribute to the welfare and well-being of the child"); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 15.5(2)(a) ("a
counselor or therapist whose presence contributes to the welfare and emotional well-being of
the child").
215. Among the many cases in which the camera focused only on the child's face and
upper body was Maryland v. Craig. See Official Transcript, Proceedings Before the Supreme
Court of the United States at 9, Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (No. 89-478).
Other examples abound. See, eg., People v. Schmitt, 204 Ill. App. 3d 820, 825, 562 N.E.2d
377, 381 (App. Ct. 1990) ("[W]e reject the defendant's argument that there was error because
July 1992]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
example. There, the child witness was placed in the judge's office with a
television camera. The defendant, attorneys, judge, and jury remained in
the courtroom where they could view the television screen transmitting
the child's image and hear the lawyers' questions and the child's answers.
The child witness could not see them. For some reason, a state trooper,
who had participated in the investigation, was present in the judge's of-
fice with the child.217 Since the officer was not on camera, he could have
influenced the child witness-however innocently-by nodding his head
or giving other signals without detection by the court or jury.218 Multi-
ple cameras and multiple monitors or split screen televising can avoid
these problems, but the additional technology may be costly. In any
event, no arrangement of cameras and monitors can match the juror's
freedom to look where he or she wants.
Another concern-one which calls into question the adversariness
of the special testimonial procedures-is that testimony delivered over
video monitors may give unfair advantage to the prosecution's case. As
any trial attorney would agree, the use of exhibits or other visual aids
during direct examination can be a powerful method of enhancing testi-
mony and capturing the jury's attention. Similarly, the use of television
the camera failed to show the entire room and those present."), appeal denied, 371 Il. 2d 670,
571 N.E.2d 154 (1991); Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 550, 524 N.E.2d 366,
376 (1988) ("The subtle nuances of eye contact, expressions, and gestures between a witnes
and others in the room are for the jury to evaluate. Hearing the disembodied, off-screen voices
of the judge and the attorneys is not ordinarily an adequate substitute for witnessing personal
interactions. Especially where child witnesses are involved, and great leeway for leading ques-
tions is allowed, jurors must be able to choose their own focus in looking for any direct or
indirect influences on a child's testimony."); People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d 249, 272, 551
N.E.2d 561, 575, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68, 82 (1990) (Alexander, J., concurring) ("A closeup focus on
the witness is also inadequate because it excludes from the jury's view the reactions of the
attorney questioning the witness. Thus the jury may miss an attorney's look of shock or dis-
may in reaction to the witness' response to a question."); State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 451
(R.I. 1989) ("[P]resent in one room were: the judge, Sally, Sally's mother, defense counsel, the
prosecutor, and the stenographer.... [A] stationary camera was pointed at Sally .. "); State
v. Thomas, 150 Wis. 2d 374, 405, 442 N.W.2d 10, 24-25 (1989) (Abrahamson, J., concurring)
("The defendant argues that, because the camera remained only on the child during her testi-
mony, the jury was unable to view the interaction between the witness and others who were
present. The majority opinion does not acknowledge the unavoidable differences between live
testimony and testimony on a screen. Videotape is indisputably superior, for purposes of ob-
serving demeanor, to a written transcript. But viewing a videotape is different from viewing a
person live."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 867 (1989); Respondent's Brief at 6, Craig (No. 89-478).
See also Commonwealth v. Tufts, 405 Mass. 610, 617, 542 N.E.2d 586, 590-91 (1989) ("The
videotape clearly shows all persons in the room, with the exception of the defendants who were
out of camera range.... It would have been better if jurors could have observed the reactions
of the defendants to the child witness's testimony during the videotaping ... .
216. 398 S.E.2d 123 (XV. Va. 1990).
217. Id. at 157 (Miller, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 158 (Miller, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 43
SHIELDING CHILD WITNESSES
in our video-addicted age may imbue the child witness's testimony with
undeserved credibility and could even mesmerize the jury.219 Moreover,
the use of special testimonial procedures may undermine the defendant's
presumption of innocence insofar as shielding the child suggests that he
or she needs protection.220
A related and perhaps more serious threat to the adversariness of
proceedings where alternative testimonial procedures are used arises
when a deliberating jury asks the court for the opportunity to review the
child's taped testimony. Although replaying the child's taped testimony
may enable the jury to take greater care in evaluating the evidence, 221 the
potential prejudice to the defendant is great.222 Any prejudice of this
kind could easily be avoided, however, by having the transcript of the
219. See Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 787, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 279
(Ct. App. 1985) ("[imt is quite conceivable that the credibility of a witness whose testimony is
presented via closed-circuit television may be enhanced by the phenomenon called status-con-
ferral; it is recognized that the media bestows prestige and enhances the authority of an indi-
vidual by legitimizing his status."); People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d 249, 271, 551 N.E.2d 561,
575, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68, 82 (1990) (recognizing the phenomenon of "status-conferral"); Jack C.
Westman, The Protection and Reliability of Children as Witnesses, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE
CHILDREN? 99, 104 (Jack C. Westman ed., 1991) (Televised presentations "affect jurors' atten-
tion and their perceptions of witness credibility and attractiveness."); see also Graham, Indicia
of Reliability, supra note 48, at 75 ("While it can be argned with some force that testimony
presented via closed circuit television or videotape is less persuasive than live testimony, in the
average case, the possibility of enhancement of credibility nevertheless certainly exists.").
220. See Graham, Indicia of Reliability, supra note 48, at 75-76. Although one of the
grounds for appeal in Coy v. Iowa was the contention that use of the screen violated the defend-
ant's right to due process because the procedure would make the defendant appear guilty and
thus erode the presumption of innocence, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988), Justice Scalia's opinion
for the Court never reached that issue, id. at 1022. The issue did not arise in Maryland v.
Craig, see 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990), and the use of one-way closed circuit television is somewhat
less problematic in that respect. Although Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Coy, posited that
"[u]nlike clothing the defendant in prison garb or having the defendant shackled and gagged,
using the screening device did not 'brand [appellant] . . . "with an unmistakable mark of
guilt,"' ". id. at 1034-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560,
571 (1986) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 518 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)))
(second alteration by court), the fact that the only person screened from the child witness's
view was the defendant is highly prejudicial, irrespective of any instruction given by the court,
because it indicates that the child witness had to be shielded from the defendant or that the
defendant had to be cordoned off from the proceedings. In contrast, the defendant in Craig
was in the same position as the judge and jury who were also outside the child witness's view.
110 S. Ct. at 3161. Arguably the procedure in the latter case suggests only that the child was
uncomfortable testifying in the courtroom. But the sense that the child required protection
remains and could evoke undue sympathy for the child witness.
221. See State v. Ross, 451 N.W.2d 231, 237 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), cert denied, 111 S.
Ct. 109 (1990); DzIECH & SCHUDSON, supra note 186, at 152.
222. As the court in Martin v. State, 747 P.2d 316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), noted:
When the jury retired to deliberate, a video player was set up in the jury room and
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audio portion of the videotape reread for the jury, rather than replaying
the videotaped testimony.
A comparison of shielded testimony and in-court testimony suggests
that the two methods are not equally reliable and do not equally ensure
adversarial testing in all circumstances. Shielding may make it more dif-
ficult for the jury to assess demeanor evidence and thus undermine the
reliability of the proceedings. It may also deprive the defense of the op-
portunity to comment on the child's reaction to the defendant's presence
and thereby undermine the adversarial nature of the proceedings.
IV. Reshaping When and How Craig Hs Implexented
What we see now is like the dim image in a mirror; then we shall see
face to face. What I know now is only partial; then it will be complete.
1 Corinthians 13:12
The analysis of the social science literature in Part II and the exami-
nation of the phenomenological aspects of shielding in Part III demon-
strate that it would be inappropriate to reach conclusions about the
reliability and adversariness of children's shielded testimony as did the
Court in Craig. We cannot be sure that truth is served when children are
shielded. The social science evidence is inconclusive. Shielding may re-
duce false recantations and stymied deliveries, but it may also increase
false allegations. Moreover, one-way closed circuit television simply can-
not be equated with live, in-court testimony due to the attendant benefits
of the latter for the defendant and the jury. With one-way closed circuit
television, the defendant is precluded from developing a defense that re-
lies on a face-to-face meeting, and jurors are denied the opportunity to
consider the full range of demeanor evidence normally available with
live, in-court testimony. These considerations provide the backdrop
upon which to resolve many of the unanswered questions identified in
Part I and to reshape how and when Craig is implemented. These con-
the video tape of E.M.'s testimony was sent back with the jury for additional view-
ing ....
We agree with the appellant that there is an important distinction between hav-
ing parts of testimony dispassionately read to a jury and allowing the jury to hear,
and see, the entire testimony of an empathetic witness, such as a child describing a
painful experience in his young life. The possibility for abuse is, we believe, substan-
tially increased with video technology.
Id. at 319. See also Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269, 1277 (Wyo. 1986) (A videotaped inter-
view was shown during the trial. Twice during deliberations the jury requested and was al-
lowed to view the videotaped interview. "The effect was to permit her to appear twice, in
color, on videotape, much as a live witness in the jury room, after the testimony was closed and
the trial concluded.").
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siderations also point to the need to construe Craig narrowly and develop
standards and procedures that give us more confidence in the reliability
and adversariness of testimony by one-way closed circuit television.
A. Invoking the Procedure
Consistent with a narrow interpretation of Craig, one-way closed
circuit television should be employed only when the defendant's presence
will render the child unable to communicate, and not because the child
will be unable to testify "effectively" or because the child will suffer more
nebulous psychic harm.223 This standard embraces those situations
where the child's testimony will otherwise be unintelligible or non-re-
sponsive, and as such is a readily verifiable criterion susceptible to objec-
tive administration. This approach also gives "voice" to a child who will
otherwise go unheard-a more compelling justification for shielding than
the desire to fortify testimony that will otherwise be merely less than
artful.
Focusing on the child's ability to communicate may also be the most
practical and fair criterion. Prosecutors have an interest in ensuring that
a child witness can communicate at trial because communication aids the
prosecutor in obtaining a conviction. Prosecutors may have no interest
or a conflict of interest in protecting a child witness from more nebulous
psychic harm, especially if protecting the child witness means jeopardiz-
ing a conviction.224 Requiring a showing of inability to communicate in
the defendant's presence would also prevent prosecutors from invoking
shielding for the mere purpose of polishing the child's presentation.
With the child's ability to communicate in the defendant's presence
properly identified as the threshold issue, the appropriate standard and
method of proof remain to be resolved. The lack of statutory direction
on the appropriate standard of proof225 indicates that numerous jurisdic-
tions have simply left this critical matter to the trial court's discretion.
However, it is important to give trial courts more guidance where consti-
tutional rights are at stake and novel procedures are being used.
223. Cf The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. Rnv. 129, 137
(1990) (advocating individualized findings that focus on the child's ability to give meaningful
testimony rather than the harm that the child would likely suffer in the defendant's presence,
but not recommending a procedure).
224. See Goodman & Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault, supra note 56, at 200 ("Prosecutors
are sometimes reluctant to use videotaped testimony because they fear that it will not be as
effective as live testimony."); Goodman, Emotional Effects, supra note 109, at 80 ("[S]ome
prosecutors expressed concern that the use of techniques such as testimony via videotape or
closed-circuit television would reduce the judge's or jury's sympathy for the child.").
225. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
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Lego v. Twomey226 is instructive in establishing a standard of proof
where preliminary fact-finding-as opposed to guilt-is at issue. In
Lego, the Court held it permissible to judge the admissibility of a confes-
sion in a criminal case by a preponderance of the evidence standard-the
standard typically applied in civil proceedings to resolve questions of lia-
bility.227 Since Lego declined to apply an elevated standard of proof to a
hearing in a criminal case implicating the constitutional right against
self-incrimination, it could be argued that a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard is appropriate when a judge in a criminal case is deciding
whether or not to shield a child witness-a hearing implicating the con-
stitutional right of physical confrontation. But other factors come into
play.
In Lego, the Court reasoned that a hearing to determine the volunta-
riness of a confession was prophylactic in purpose-that is, aimed at de-
terring unlawful police conduct, and not concerned with the "reliability
of jury verdicts. '228 The Court also intimated that where the reliability
of jury verdicts is at stake, In re Winship's2 29 mandate of a reasonable
doubt standard applies. 230 In contrast, the Court has clearly indicated
that the Confrontation Clause addresses the reliability of jury verdicts.231
This position implies that more than a preponderance of the evidence
standard is appropriate when a court is considering compromising physi-
cal confrontation. But the Court has also stated that physical confronta-
tion might actually "disserve the . . . truth-seeking goal" of the
Confrontation Clause where the child is so overwhelmed by the defend-
226. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
227. Id. at 489.
228. Id. at 484-86.
229. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
230. See Lego, 404 U.S. at 486. Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg has argued that the sup-
pression of involuntary confessions is based in part on their unreliability, and the Court's un-
willingness to acknowledge this fact and apply the reasonable doubt standard foreshadows "an
unyielding preponderance standard" for preliminary fact matters in criminal cases. Stephen
A. Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REv. 271,
280-81 (1975). That prediction was partially borne out by the ruling in Boujaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), where the Court approved the use of a preponderance of the
evidence standard for the admission of a co-conspirator's hearsay statement, id. at 175-76, even
though the unreliability of this sort of statement is generally acknowledged, see IM-
WINKELRIED, supra note 187, at 44. Lego, nevertheless, also notes that the states are free to
apply a higher standard. 404 U.S. at 489.
231. Indeed, in Craig, the Court noted: "The central concern of the Confrontation Clause
is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to
rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact." Maryland
v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3163 (1990). The Court also acknowledged that the more specific
right of physical confrontation "enhances the accuracy of fact-finding by reducing the risk that
a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent person." Id. at 3164.
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ant's presence that the child is unable to testify effectively. 232 The argu-
ment would be that rather than undermining In re Winship's mandate,
we are actually furthering it by protecting children from testimonial
stress. This argument must fail, however, because the state of the empiri-
cal data is such that we cannot be sure in a particular case whether pro-
tective procedures are comforting an injured child or fortifying a lying or
otherwise misreporting child. This weakness in the argument under-
scores the fact that the social science data informing the confrontation
question is in flux and warrants cautious decision-making. 233
The purpose of a criminal trial is to do justice, and the value of
truth-seeking in a criminal trial is the value of promoting justice. An
important element of justice is that we prefer to allow some guilty to go
free than convict the innocent. 234 Child witness procedures that increase
the number of defendants correctly found guilty may be unacceptable if
they also increase the number of defendants wrongfully found guilty.235
While shielding procedures may convict more guilty defendants-an es-
pecially desirable result given the recidivism rate for child abuse236-they
may also convict more innocent ones-an especially undesirable result
given the stigma and severe penalties associated with such a
conviction.237
Until we know more about these protective procedures, the prosecu-
tion should bear the risk. Proof by clear and convincing evidence is an
elevated standard and provides the defendant with the extra measure of
protection warranted by the current state of the empirical data. It is also
a relatively manageable burden for the prosecution.238 Before ordering
232. Id. at 3169.
233. See supra Part II.
234. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
235. We will not always be confronted with the question of guilt or innocence in absolute
terms, because often the degree of guilt will be at issue. The latter arises whenever there are
lesser-included and lesser-related offenses charged against the defendant.
236. See A. Nicholas Groth et al., Undetected Recidivism Among Rapists and Child Mo-
lesters, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 450, 452-53 (1982) (regarding child sexual abusers and sex of-
fenders in general).
237. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (providing for
mandatory consecutive sentencing); ia § 290 (requiring convicted sex offenders to register
their presence, fingerprints and photograph with local authorities). In addition, it is a matter
of common knowledge that incarcerated sex offenders are at risk for violence from other in-
mates and sometimes need to be segregated from the general prison population.
238. Professor C.M.A. McCauliff conducted a survey that asked federal judges to identify
the percentage of certainty required by various standards of proof. C.M.A. McCauliff, Bur-
dens of Proof Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND.
L. REv. 1293, 1325 n.184 (1982). The average percentage for proof beyond a reasonable doubt
was 90.28% certainty. The average percentage for proof by clear and convincing evidence was
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alternative testimonial procedures, therefore, the trial court should deter-
mine on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the child witness
will not be able to communicate in the defendant's presence. 239
The best way to determine whether a child will be able to communi-
cate in the defendant's presence is to observe the child on the witness
stand in the defendant's presence. Given the dissatisfying nature of pre-
dictive expert testimony,240 the elevated standard of proof may require as
much.241 If the child is able to communicate in the defendant's presence,
then the system avoids both the expense of the special testimonial proce-
dures and the less quantifiable loss of physical confrontation's benefits.
Moreover, if the child is unable to communicate in the defendant's pres-
ence, the jury still benefits from having observed the child's demeanor in
the defendant's presence before the child is removed for shielding.242
This procedure may sound insensitive to the child. In Craig the
State argued that requiring a face-to-face meeting adds "the unconscion-
able requirement that child victims of physical and sexual abuse be trau-
matized further before they can be deemed in need of special
protection. '243 But such an argument assumes guilt inasmuch as it as-
sumes a victim, and our system is grounded on a presumption of inno-
cence. Moreover, especially where the critical inquiry is the child's
ability to communicate (in contrast to a showing of general psychological
trauma), the potential harm is limited in quality and duration-notably a
considerably less, 74.99% certainty, and the average percentage for proof by a preponderance
of the evidence was 55.33% certainty. Id. at 1332.
239. It might be argued that the state's interest in the protection of child witnesses should
be considered in formulating the appropriate burden of proof. But Craig suggests that the
state's interest in protecting children is weighty enough to overcome the defendant's right to
physical confrontation only insofar as it serves the truth-seeking function of confrontation. See
Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3167-70 (1990).
240. Until social science develops a protocol based on reliable data, and unless the expert
can render a fact-based opinion which follows that protocol, the elevated standard of proof will
militate against the use of predictive testimony (i.e., the "battle of experts") to resolve the
threshold question of the child's ability to communicate.
241. Judges often reserve ruling on motions in limine until they see how the evidence
unfolds at trial. Except where the evidence at the pretrial hearing is overwhelming, judges
would similarly reserve ruling on a motion to shield a child witness until after observing the
child's performance on the witness stand.
242. If the child is unable to communicate under normal courtroom conditions, the judge
should observe the child witness in the defendant's presence but outside the presence of the
jury and the public. This approach would permit the judge to ascertain that the child is react-
ing to the defendant's presence and not to the courtroom generally. If the child's inability to
communicate stems only from the jury's and public's presence, the defendant should be able to
accompany counsel into the special testimonial room with the child.
243. Brief for Petitioner at 30, Craig (No. 89-478).
1310 [Vol. 43
harm we are willing to permit when the prosecution summons the child
into the defendant's presence for the limited purpose of identification.244
This procedure would be even more valuable if as a preliminary
matter the prosecutor had to demonstrate that efforts were made to pre-
pare the child for the testimonial experience, 245 because preparation
would eliminate the possibility that a child's poor showing stemmed from
a lack of familiarity with the process. 246 The prosecutor can help prepare
the child witness the way any trial lawyer might prepare a naive witness:
by taking the child to the courtroom when it is not in session to show the
child the physical layout of the room and to demonstrate where the vari-
ous courtroom players will be situated; by returning with the child when
the court is hearing a trial so that the child can see what actually occurs
in a courtroom; and by introducing the child to the various members of
the courtroom staff and explaining their various functions.247 Not only
would such preparation better equip the child witness to testify, but it
may also blunt any psychological trauma that a child would otherwise
experience in the courtroom.
Most social scientists agree that while some children are trauma-
tized by the courtroom experience, others are empowered by it.248 Many
244. For example, the Maryland statute at issue in Craig provides that it "may not be
interpreted to preclude, for purposes of identification of a defendant, the presence of the victim
and the defendant in the courtroom at the same time." MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC.
§ 9-102(d) (1989). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(h) (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-8-55(h) (Supp. 1991) (GA. CODE ANN. § 81-1006.2(h) (Harrison Supp. 1991)); IDAHO
CODE § 19-3024A.7 (Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283.B (West Supp. 1992);
WASH. RE V. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.150(5) (West Supp. 1991) (for purposes of establishing or
challenging the identification of the defendant).
245. This would be similar to the requirement that prosecutors demonstrate a good faith
effort to obtain the presence of the witness at trial before prior testimony (hearsay) may be
introduced. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980).
246. See Karen J. Saywitz, Children's Conceptions of the Legal System: "Court Is a Place
to Play Basketball, " in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY, supra note 159, at 131,
153 ("Child witnesses have a limited and at times faulty understanding of the system in which
they are participating. Often, they do not accurately understand what is happening around
them. They require age-appropriate preparation regarding the people, places, and procedures
of the legal system.").
247. By statute, the state of Washington requires such a showing. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.44.150(1)(e) (West Supp. 1991) ("The court [must find] that the prosecutor has
made all reasonable efforts to prepare the child for testifying, including informing the child or
the child's parent or guardian about community counseling services, giving court tours, and
explaining the trial process.").
248. See, e.g., Lucy Berliner, The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations,
40 U. MIAMIi L. REv. 167, 174-75 (1985) ("Counselors have found that children sometimes
psychologically benefit by participating in the criminal justice system."); Lucy Berliner &
Mary K. Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs No.
2, at 125, 135 (1984) ("Some children report feeling empowered by their participation in the
process. Some have complained, when the offender pled guilty, that they did not have an
July 1992] SHIELDING CHILD WITNESSES
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
social scientists who identify the courtroom experience as potentially ca-
thartic link the positive aspects of the experience to adequate preparation
of the child.249 Indeed, although Gail Goodman, in examining the effects
of criminal court testimony on a sample of 218 child sexual assault vic-
tims, concluded that "[o]n average, the short-term effects were traumatic
rather than cathartic, 250 she also observed that "systematic attempts to
prepare the children were only infrequently made. '251 This suggests that
the first line of attack in promoting the welfare of child witnesses should
lie not during trial through reliance upon special testimonial procedures,
but before trial with conscientious preparation of the child by the prose-
cutor252 and others.253
opportunity to be heard in court."); Spencer Eth, The Child Victim as Witness in SexualAbuse
Proceedings, 51 PSYCHIATRY 221, 225 (1988) ("[F]rom what children and adults have told us
about their testimony, sometimes years later, the opportunity to speak aloud is of overriding
importance."); Gary B. Melton, Sexually Abused Children and the Legal Syster: Some Policy
Recommendations, 13 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY No. 1, at 61, 65 (1985) ("At least for some child
victims, the experience may be cathartic; it provides an opportunity for taking control of the
situation, achieving vindication, and symbolically putting an end to the episode.") (citations
omitted).
249. See, eg., Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 248, at 130 ("The attorney who may present
the child as witness should do everything possible from the outset to give the child emotional
support and accurate information about what will ensue."); Eth, supra note 248, at 225 ("The
child's experience as a witness can be affected by pretrial preparation by a mental health pro-
fessional, child advocate, or witness assistance program."); Melton, supra note 248, at 63
("High levels of anxiety adversely affect recall and cognitive functioning. Thus, interventions
designed to reduce ambiguity about the situation (e.g., visiting the courtroom prior to testi-
mony) and the scariness of testimony itself (e.g., a friendly word from the judge) may improve
the quality of children's testimony.").
250. Goodman, Emotional Effects, supra note 109, at 104. Significantly, she further con-
cluded: "In contrast, by the time the cases were resolved, the mental health of most children
who testified was similar to that of children who did not take the stand." Id. This finding
suggests that long term trauma from testifying may not be a pervasive problem.
251. Id. at 110.
252. This requirement should not prove unduly burdensome to prosecutors. Many prose-
cution agencies are subdivided into specialization units where prosecutors concentrate on par-
ticular types of crimes, such as drug-related crimes, gang-related crimes, or sex crimes. This
type of organization allows prosecutors to develop an expertise in handling certain types of
evidence and witnesses. Prosecutors who are part of a sex crimes unit would receive training
on the special needs of child witnesses.
253. A specialized witness assistance program might prove invaluable and would shift
some of the burden from the prosecutor to the courts and the community. See Westman, supra
note 219, at 109 (arguing for "the use of child advocacy teams that are assembled on the
initiation of legal actions and support the children through the entire process"). Compassion
from a designated support person could help transform the testimonial experience from a trau-
matic one to an empowering one. Alternative methods of preparing children for the testimo-
nial experience also might be developed-including illustrated books, cartoons, and mock
proceedings.
These suggestions identify empowerment and not protectionism as the primary goal. As
C.S. Lewis observed, "the ravenous need to be needed will gratify itself either by keeping its
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In conclusion, consistent with Craig, the courts should focus on the
child's ability to communicate and find by clear and convincing evidence
that the child is not able to communicate when confronted with the de-
fendant in the courtroom. The procedure utilized to determine whether
the child is unable to communicate should involve actual confrontation
after preparation of the child witness. This procedure provides the judge
with reliable evidence of the child's situation, obviating the need to rely
on predictive and potentially biased expert testimony. In addition, it
provides the jury with useful information concerning the child's de-
meanor when confronted by the defendant.
B. Refraining the Inquiry
Although the focus on the child's ability to communicate is most
consistent with a narrow interpretation of Craig, the law may develop
differently. Craig's requirement of only "more than de minimis" emo-
tional distress in the defendant's presence invites a lesser standard.
Courts and legislatures may adopt a broader reading of Craig that per-
mits them to focus on the psychological well-being of the child irrespec-
tive of the child's ability to communicate, or that allows them to consider
any "more than de minimis" impairment of the child's ability to commu-
nicate. In doing so, however, courts and legislatures should reframe the
inquiry to take into account case-specific factors that go beyond the child
witness's needs to consider the reliability and adversariness of the pro-
ceedings both with and without shielding. Indeed, courts should always
consider these factors-even where the child witness may be silenced by
the defendant's presence in the traditional courtroom setting.254
objects needy or by inventing for them imaginary needs. It will do this all the more ruthlessly
because it thinks (in one sense truly) that it is a Gift-love and therefore regards itself as 'unself-
ish.'" C.S. LEwis, THE FOUR LovEs 76-77 (1960). He adds: "But the proper aim of giving
is to put the recipient in a state where he [or she] no longer needs our gift." Id. at 76. This is
not to say that all children at all ages will be readily empowered or that some children will not
need protection, but that we might be able to give these children an enduring sense of self-
confidence by preparing them for the courtroom experience and not sacrifice physical
confrontation.
254. It should not be our policy to obtain the child's testimony at all costs. The more
relaxed atmosphere provided by shielding may facilitate false reports, and a child's silence is
preferable to unreliable testimony. Achieving optimal reliability and adversariness should be
the paramount concern in each instance.
A recent case in San Diego, California illustrates the point. An eight-year-old girl com-
plained that her father had excessively kissed and hugged her during his weekly visits (the
girl's natural parents were divorced and she was living with her mother, stepfather, and
younger brother at the time). John Wilkens & Jim Okerblom, Molesting Conviction Tossed
Out, SAN DIEGO UNION, June 20, 1992, at B-l, B-7. A counselor discussed molestation with
the girl, read to the girl from two books, I Told My Secret and No More Secrets, and then
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In prescribing whether or not to compromise a defendant's confron-
tation right and allow the special testimonial procedures, most statutes-
to the extent that they specifically delineate the relevant inquiry-focus
exclusively on the child's needs.2 55 The "truth-seeking" goal of the Con-
frontation Clause is compromised, however, if we ignore the other side of
the equation-that is, if the judge does not also take into consideration
aspects of the particular case that may underscore the defendant's need
for physical confrontation.
The facts of Craig present a perfect example. The alleged child vic-
tim, Brooke Etze, attended Craig's preschool when she was between four
and six years old from August 1984 through June 7, 1986, and Brooke's
parents were entirely satisfied with the school during that time.256 Ap-
parently, nothing that Brooke said or that the parents observed suggested
any foul play. On June 21, 1986, Brooke's parents read a newspaper
article recounting the complaints of children who had been abused at
reported suspected sexual abuse to county authorities. On the eve of her father's trial, the girl
recanted her claims. The State moved for a continuance based on the counselor's testimony
that the stress of testifying at the father's preliminary hearing had caused the girl to recant,
and that it would take "a couple of months" to "loosen some of the denial." Id. at B-7. The
trial court continued the trial over the objection of the defense. Id. After three months of
additional counselling, the girl repeated the allegations of abuse. The subsequent conviction
was reversed on appeal. Id. at B-1.
This case is troubling because it involves priming a witness to say what we want the
witness to say. What if the trial had not been delayed, the prosecutor had moved instead to
present the girl's testimony by one-way closed circuit television, and in this more relaxed testi-
monial environment the child repeated the abuse allegations? Should we be any less troubled?
It would seem that shielding in the face of recantation raises serious questions about the relia-
bility and adversariness of the proceedings, particularly if the jury never sees the recantation.
255. For example, the Alaska statute provides:
In making a determination ... the court shall consider factors it considers relevant,
including (I) the child's chronological age; (2) the child's level of development; (3)
the child's general physical health; (4) any physical, emotional, or psychological in-
jury experienced by the child; and (5) the mental or emotional strain that will be
caused by requiring the child to testify under normal courtroom procedures.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046(b) (1990). Similarly, the Connecticut law states that
the court may order the defendant excluded from the room or screened from the
sight and hearing of the child only if the state proves, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that the child would be so intimidated, or otherwise inhibited, by the physical
presence of the defendant that a compelling need exists to take the testimony of the
child outside the physical presence of the defendant in order to insure the reliability
of such testimony.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g(a) (West Supp. 1991). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2163a(9) (West Supp. 1991) ("[T]he court shall consider the following: (a) The age of
the witness. (b) The psychological maturity of the witness. (c) The nature of the offense or
offenses. (d) The desire of the witness or his or her family or guardian .... ").
256. Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 254, 544 A.2d 784, 786 (Ct. Spec. App. 1988), rev'd,
316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
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Craig's school.257 A week or two later, they received an invitation to a
meeting sponsored by the county's sexual assault center and social serv-
ices and health departments.258 Brooke's parents attended the meeting
and, as a result of what they learned there, arranged to have Brooke
evaluated by a therapist at the sexual assault center. It was not until the
fourth or fifth session with the therapist that Brooke said things that
suggested she had been the victim of abuse. The therapist contacted the
police and social services departments, which joined in the investigation
of Brooke's complaints.259 The prosecutor was allowed to sit in on
twelve of the twenty "therapy" sessions with Brooke.26° In ensuing con-
versations with her parents and in further sessions with her therapist,
Brooke implicated several people. Among the accused were Ms. Craig,
two of Ms. Craig's children, and other children at the school.261
Several key facts, independently and in combination, created a need
to safeguard physical confrontation in Craig. First, the alleged child vic-
tim did not make any spontaneous statements that suggested the
abuse.262 Indeed, she apparently said nothing until after four or five
pointed therapy sessions-sessions that were designed to uncover abuse
rather than explore the child's general well-being. 263 Second, the parents
were not prompted to act by anything they observed about or learned
from their child.264 Only a pointed letter from the county and a subse-
quent town meeting spurred the parents to act.265 Third, the therapy
sessions did not take place in a clinically neutral environment-rather,
the prosecutor was present at twelve of the twenty therapy sessions. Fi-
nally, the child identified multiple assailants.266 These circumstances
257. Id.
258. Id. at 254-55, 544 A.2d at 786.
259. Id. at 255, 544 A.2d at 786.
260. Id at 263, 544 A.2d at 790.
261. Id. at 255, 544 A.2d at 786.
262. The Court has identified spontaneity and consistent repetition as factors that indicate
the reliability of a child's abuse allegations. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150 (1990)
(citing State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 201, 735 P.2d 801, 811 (1987)).
263. The Court has also noted that interrogation, prompting or manipulation by adults
indicate that a child's abuse allegations may not be trustworthy. Id. at 3152.
264. For instance, parents might be prompted if they observe their child acting out sexu-
ally or if they observe an unusual physical condition, such as swelling, bleeding, or discharge in
the child's genital area.
265. Interestingly, in the McMartin case, the police department sent a letter to the various
parents of children in the subject preschool, indicating that they were investigating a complaint
of sexual abuse at the school. Timnick & McGraw, supra note 1, at A20. Media accounts
following the first McMartin trial indicated that the deliberating jurors were troubled by this
fact and believed that these letters contaminated the subsequent investigation. See, e.g., id. at
A19.
266. This factor also figured prominently in the McMartin litigation. As at least one jour-
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cast doubt on the trustworthiness of Brooke's abuse allegations, 267 but
the trial judge was not statutorily obligated to consider any circum-
stances beyond the child's needs in deciding whether or not to allow the
shielding procedure.
Statutes providing for the use of one-way closed circuit television
should, in addition to requiring an individualized finding that the child
witness will suffer significant (i.e., more than de minimis) trauma in the
physical presence of the defendant, include a provision requiring the
judge to consider any case-specific need that there may be for physical
confrontation. In other words, the court should closely examine any
need there may be for physical confrontation based on particular case
facts, and not simply compare the need for physical confrontation in the
abstract with the particularized showing of likely trauma to the child.
Otherwise, there can be no appreciation of the interests at stake, and
Craig calls for close examination of the competing interests.268
After examining the particularized interests involved, the trial court
should allow shielding only if it finds that the reliability and adversari-
ness of the proceedings will be better assured by shielding than by physi-
cal confrontation. Of course, this means that the focus of the pretrial
evidentiary hearing is broadened from an inquiry into the child's needs to
an inquiry into the necessities of the case269 (an inquiry that will-as it
should-embrace the confrontation concerns of the defendant as well as
the child). But this broader inquiry need not prove burdensome to the
courts. We can expect courts, with the help of the litigants, to identify
classes of circumstances that particularly warrant physical confrontation.
These might be found, for example, where child abuse allegations arise in
nalist noted, the child witnesses identified not one, not two, but more than a half-dozen people
as child molesters, all of whom happened to work in the same place. See Norma Meyer & Paul
Pringle, No Convictions in McMartin Case, SAN DIEGO UNION, Jan. 19, 1990, at A-I, A-13.
267. As Professor Ceci has observed,
it is of the utmost importance to examine the conditions prevalent at the time of a
child's original report about a criminal event in order to judge the suitability of using
that child as a witness in the court. It seems particularly important to kmow the
circumstances under which the initial report of concern was made, how many times
the child was questioned, the hypotheses of the interviewers who questioned [the]
child, the kinds of questions the child was asked, [and] the consistency of the child's
report over a period of time.... [A]ny of these conditions would not in and of itself
invalidate a child's testimony, but it ought to raise cautions in the mind of the court.
Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, The Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Review
and Synthesis, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript at 53, on file with the
Hastings Law Journal).
268. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3165 (1990).
269. Id. ("We have accordingly interpreted the Confrontation Clause in a manner sensi-
tive to its purposes and sensitive to the necessities of trial and the adversary process.")
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suspect circumstances270 or defense theories require a face-to-face meet-
ing.271 We also would not expect courts to prejudge the facts of the case,
but only to determine whether the case encompasses circumstances war-
ranting a face-to-face meeting, either to check influences that spawn false
or inaccurate allegations of child abuse, or to effectuate a defense.272
270. This Article makes no attempt to provide an exhaustive list of suspect circumstances
in child abuse cases. Nevertheless, some social scientists have documented the desire of chil-
dren to please authority figures. This tendency is implicated when, as in Craig, children are
subjected to repeated and leading questioning by parents and other investigators of the alleged
abuse. See Stephen J. Ceci et al., Suggestibility of Children's Memory: Psycholegal Implica-
tions, 116 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 38, 46 (1987) (Suggestibility can be explained in part
by children's tendency to conform to an adult's wishes. Children exposed to a seven-year-old
questioner were significantly more likely to recognize correctly the original event than were
their peers who were exposed to an adult questioner.); Carol B. Cole & Elizabeth F. Loftus,
The Memory of Children, in CHILDREN'S EYwrrNFss MEMORY, supra note 117, at 178, 199
("[T]he demand characteristics of being given certain information by an adult, and even of
being questioned by an adult are powerful components of suggestibility in young children.");
Goodman & Clarke-Stewart, supra note 144, at 103 ("Clarke-Stewart's findings indicate that
children can be led by a persistent interrogator to change their descriptions of what they have
seen or what has been done if the event is somewhat ambiguous to start."); Amye Warren et
al., Inducing Resistance to Suggestibility in Children, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 273, 283 (1991)
("Recent research indicates that children tend to interpret repeated questioning alone as feed-
back that their initial responses are incorrect and thus exhibit a greater propensity toward
changing their answers."). These circumstances might warrant physical confrontation.
Another example of suspect circumstances that might warrant physical confrontation ap-
pears when the allegations of abuse arise in the context of divorce or custody proceedings.
Studies indicate that the likelihood of false accusations increases dramatically in these situa-
tions. See Elissa P. Benedek & Diane H. Schetky, Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Child Cus-
tody and Visitation Disputes, in EMERGING ISSUES IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 145,
155 (Diane H. Schetky & Elissa P. Benedek eds., 1985) (failing to document charges of sexual
abuse in 10 of 18 children evaluated during disputes over custody and visitation, a false-posi-
tive incidence of 55%); Eth, supra note 248, at 224 (attributing the rise in false reports during
divorce and child custody disputes to "the judicial trend of awarding joint custody, a decree
that forces angry, spiteful ex-spouses to continue to share their children," and to the vindictive
parent who encourages a child to repeat the parent's false allegations of abuse); Arthur H.
Green, True and False Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Child Custody Disputes, 25 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD PSYCHIATRY 449, 449 (1986) (documenting four false allegations in eleven children
reported to be sexually abused by the noncustodial parent, an incidence of 36%); Haugaard et
al., supra note 117, at 258 ("If a child who is told to say a certain thing by one parent believes
that the parent's instruction makes the child's statement the truth, then the child could speak
'the truth' in a way that could mislead a jury.").
271. See supra notes 187-200 and accompanying text.
272. Again, the San Diego case, in which the court continued the trial because the child
witness was recanting, is instructive. See supra note 254. A court considering a motion to
shield that child witness might consider the following factors: The child's initial complaint;
the child's testimony at the preliminary hearing; that the child was the subject of visitation
rights; the suggestive counseling of the child; and the child's recantation. All of these factors
relate to the quality of the child's abuse allegations and the need for a face-to-face meeting to
check the risk of a false-positive report.
On the other hand, it would amount to prejudging the case to consider the following
factors: That the defendant denied molesting his daughter; that the defendant passed two lie
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Under the model proposed here, the trial judge would consider
Brooke's situation and then look beyond Brooke's needs as a child wit-
ness to the needs of the case. After examining the particularized interests
of the defense and the prosecution, a discerning judge might decide that
the investigatory techniques employed in Craig were so suggestive as to
create a compelling need for physical confrontation-a mechanism
which (presumably) prevents false positives-and initally deny the mo-
tion to shield the child witness. If Brooke were uncommunicative in the
confrontational setting, then the court could resort to shielding and the
jury would enjoy the benefit of having observed the child witness in the
courtroom.
The factual possibilities are limitless. Another judge may decline to
shield even an uncommunicative child witness upon concluding that the
child's silence was preferable to the risk of unreliable testimony. Such
might be the case where the child has told grossly inconsistent stories at
different times and is unable to testify in the defendant's presence. In yet
another case, the court might conclude that shielding is necessary to pro-
tect a child witness who was allegedly brutalized by the defendant, so
long as there was no contamination of the investigatory process and no
marked deviation in the child's story over time. The same judge in the
same case might initially require physical confrontation where the de-
fense has raised identification as an issue and then resort to shielding
only if the child is uncommunicative.
Reasonable judges might reach different conclusions, but the pro-
posed model gives the judge more information with which to decide
whether and when to shield a child witness. Rather than myopically fo-
cusing on the child's needs, this model allows shielding only if that pro-
cedure will best advance the reliability and adversariness of the
proceedings. Framing the inquiry in this way acknowledges, as does
detector tests; that the defendant rejected a plea bargain which called for him to plead guilty to
a misdemeanor charge in exchange for a prosecution reccomendation that he serve no jail time
(he was charged with three felonies); or the conflicting medical testimony as to whether the
girl's genital area showed signs of abuse. See Wilkens & Okerblom, supra note 254, at B-7. To
be sure, the latter factors are logically relevant to an inquiry into the trustworthiness of the
child's abuse allegations, but a consideration of these factors would require a grossly impracti-
cal mini-trial.
The Supreme Court rejected such a mini-trial approach in an analogous situation when it
circumscribed the inquiry into the reliability of a child's out-of-court statements. See Idaho v.
Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3147 (1990) (The statements did not fall into a firmly rooted hearsay
exception.). In Wright, the State pressed the Court to consider evidence that would corrobo-
rate the truth of the child's statements, id. at 3148, but the Court rejected this approach and
limited the inquiry to the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, id at 3149.
Similarly, the inquiry here would be limited to the quality of the abuse allegations themselves
and other circumstances that might warrant a face-to-face meeting.
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Craig, that the reliability and adversariness of the proceedings are the
touchstones of truth-seeking under the Confrontation Clause.
Conclusion
Child abuse cases are troubling, for many reasons. The victims are
truly vulnerable and their cause cries out for justice. Arguably, the
fabric of society is revealed from the way these most vulnerable of vic-
tims are treated.273 Yet, because these victims evoke so much sympathy,
one could just as well infer something about the fabric of society from the
way it treats those charged with child abuse.
We need to proceed cautiously when compromising a criminal de-
fendant's right of physical confrontation, especially when we do it in the
name of truth. In the interest of truth, we must be mindful that there are
at least two sides to every story. Accordingly, this analysis underscores
the need to construe Craig narrowly and to engage in a more balanced
inquiry when the time comes for the judge to decide whether or not to
allow the use of one-way closed circuit television in a given case. Until
we can be sure that shielding the child witness does not promote false
positives as well as prevent false negatives, justice requires at least this
much. The proposals set forth herein are consistent with the holding and
logic of Craig, and appropriately take into account the interests of child
witnesses, the rights of criminal defendants, and the needs of the criminal
justice system in obtaining reliable evidence.
273. See generally David Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in
the Criminal System, 15 WAYNE L. Rv. 977 (1969) (arguing that while juvenile delinquents
enjoy special protections, child victims have been neglected by the American criminal justice
system).
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